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FOREWORD
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a fndamental The phrase "sustainable development" has
change in the way governments and development been widely used, but we are still some way from
agencies think about environment and a generally-recognized, operational definition of
development The two are no longer regarded as the concept. In particular. such a definition must
mutually exclusive. It is now recognized that a be set in a usable analytical framework.
healthy environment is essential to sustainable This paper attempts to show how
development and a healthy economy. Moreover, appropriate economic incentives in the economy at
economists and planners are beginning to large, and the use of specific economic
recognize that economic development that erodes instruments targeted at air pollution, can make an
natural capital is often not successful. In fact. important practical contribution to sustainable
development strategies and programs that do not developmenL The focus here is on the use of a
take adequate account of the state of critical common natural resource, namely the air we
resources-forests, soils, grasslands, freshwater, breathe, and ways in which it can be protected.
coastal areas, and fisheries-may degrade the lbe paper argues that, although free market
resource base upon which future growth is forces alone may not achieve sustainable
dependenL developmeaL they can help us to make progress
Since its creation, the Vice Presidency for towards it through better resource managenent
Evironmentally Sustainable Development (ESDŽ Furthermore, the analysis and simulations
has placed the highest priority on the analysis of presented in the paper suggest that by intervening
these important issues. Within ESD, the in markets, especially energy markets, to allow for
Enviromnent Department's work in particular has externalities, those same market forces can be
focused on the links between environment and harnessed to produce further environmenal
development and the implications of these links improvements. Besides other interventions, the
for development policy in general. The objecive paper considers systems of taxes and trading in
of the Enviromment Paper Series is to make the property rights.
results of our work available to the general public.
Mohamed T. El Ashry
Director
Environment Department
vil
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ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR THE CONTROL OF
AIR POLLUTION IN POLAND
Abstract
Like other Central European countries, standards. Third, there are clear cost savings
Poland faces the twin challenges of improving from using incentive-based policy
environmental quality whilc also promoting instruments, even though the exact size of the
economic development. Thlis study examines savings cannot be precisely idenfied.
the cost oi achieving alternative emission Finally, the impacts on invesument and energy
standards a:ud the savings in abatement cost prices of environmental policies are likely to
that might be achieved with policies that rely be dwarfed by the forces of economic
on econonmic incentives rather than with xigid restructuring and energy price refonr.
"con.mand and control" measures. The focus The analysis also suggests a dynamic
is primarily on dtree pollutants arising from and mixed strategy for the iemenation of
energy cornbusdion-particulate matter (PM), economic instruments. Starting with
nitrogen oxides (NO.), and sulphur dioxide command and control, emission fees could be
(SOx0-although carbon dioxide (C0 2) rincrased to encourage some additional
emissions also are tacked. A central element abatement and technical innovation and to
of the analysis is a dynanic model of least- provided added ievenues to be used, e.g., for
cost energy supply in Poland that allows cleanup of existing environmental damages.
acaminanion at a national level of the effects Howevcr, it is unlikey that fees can be
of different poilution standards and policies. increased to i. level necessary to meet
The simulation analysis suggests, first, current emissions standards. To accomplish
that significant decreases in air pollution this goal cost-effectively, an evolutionary
emissions seem likely from economic movement toward enissions trading should
resuucturing and energy pricing refonns and be considered. Trading could start with
that tighter (enforced) eiission standards infomWal bilateral transactions, as in the US,
such as those envisaged under current Polish and become more extenive as cirmstances
policy are likely to generate considerablc and the interests of polluters warrant.
additional decreases in ollution. Second, the However, even limited emissions trading
Polish legal standards differ in important would require clearer legal and regulatory
respccts from representative West European authority, as well as continued progress in
standards, but the costs of meeting the two economic restructuring. We further
altemative sets of standards in Poland do not cmphasize the importance of continued
appear to be widely different. The costs of progress in economic and energy price reform
the strict German standards, on the other as both a complement to and a prerequisite
hand. are significantly higher, underscoring a for success in envirnmental policy, so that
need for corresponding benefit assessment to finms have incentives to seek out lower-cost
deteniine the value to Poland of such abatement options.
Chapter I
INITRODUCTION
Like other Central European countries, level of the effects of different pollution
Poland faces the twin challenges of improving standards and policies. The simulations
environmental quality while also promoting provide considerable disaggregation by type
economic development. PoUution, especially of fuel and sector. With these model outputs
in the air, poses serious threats to human we can calculate the costs of different
health and other resources in many parts of emission standards and of different policies to
the country, though the precise extent of the attain specified standards over the next 25
hazards remains controversial. At the same years.
time, excessive expenditure on pollution The model deals only with categories
mitigation must be avoided, given a scarcity of emitters and generic categories of emission
of capital needed for raising living standards. standards rather than specifying the size,
This study examiines two broad issues spatial location, and emissions standards of
related to the design of air pollution policy in specific sources. Consequently, the model
Poland. The first issue is the cost of cannot be used to analyze the cost of different
achieving altemative emission standards that ambient air quality standards or the cost of
are of potential interest for Polish different means for achieving specified
environrmental policy. The second issue is the ambient standards: our policy simulations
savings in abatement cost that might be ignore ambient air quality constraints and
achieved if a particular set of standards is focus only on the achievement of emission
implemented with policies that rely on standards. This is an important drawback,
economic incentivez-particularly taxes on both from a practical perspective (Polish
emissions or tradable emission pernits- regulations include ambient as well as
rather than with rigid "command and control" emissions standards) and an analytical
(CAC) measures. In this analysis the perspective (the design of cost-effective
enmission standards themselves are taken as regulation is complicated by the need to meet
given rather than being inferred from a ambient standards as well as enmission
broader study of pollution damages and standards). The model also takes as given
abatement costs. broad trends in the composition and energy
The focus is primarily on pollutants intensity of economic activity; it does not
arising from energy combustion-particulate describe the process of economic
matter (PM), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and restructuring itself. Two studies now under
sulphur dioxide (SO2 ).' Carbon dioxide way by the World Bank are designed to
(CC2 ) emissions also are tracked. A central address these gaps. The first, financed in part
element of the analysis is a dynamic model of by the U.K. Environmental Know How Fund,
least-cost energy supply in Poland. The is extending the analysis of altemative policy
model, developed at the Polish Academy of instruments to a local level, by examining air
Sciences, allows examination at a national pollution and environmental management in
the Krakow region. Air dispersion modeling
provides the link between emissions and
1Emissions from industrial processes (e.g., cement ambient standards. The second, assisted by
manufacturing) also are included, though they are a Norwegian financing, is considering how
very small part of the total.
2Poland is restructuring economnic incentives in 1988-89, it was the third largest emitter of
general and analyzing the impact on the S02 and NOx in Europe, after the former
energy sector and air pollution in particular. Soviet Union and Germany; with regard to
Subject to these caveats, the simulation PM, it ranked second (Nowicki 1993); and
analysis provides estimates of the potential S0 2 and NOx emnissior per US$ of GNP
gains from relying upon incentive-based were the highest among all countries of
policies over CAC for meeting emission Central and Eastern Europe, including the
targets. Even in advanced industrial former Soviet Union (World Resources
economiies, not al dtis potential vwill be Institute 1992). One of the characteristics of
reached, because of imperfections in markets air pollution in Poland is that the sources of
and policies. A prominent example of market emissions are heavily concentrated. In
distortions is imperfect regulation of the Katowice and Krakow, two of the most
electric power sector. Enviromnental policies polluted regLons, emissions of dust and gases
may also depart from the ideal to achieve in 1990 were 5-9 times and 10-12 times the
compromises with equity or other social national average per unit land area
goals. Problems of this type are multiplied in respectively (Central Statistical Office 1991,
transitional economies like Poland's, in which Table I)- In consequence, a disproportionate
market inctitutions are stil evolving, the state number of people in these regions is affected
continues to play a substantial role in the by air pollution.
economy, and social goals are not clearly Upper Silesia, which contains the
defined and in flux. Katowice region, has only 10 percent of the
To address these points we include nation's population and 2 percent of its land
some discussion of how environmental area, but it is responsible for about one-third
policies are carried out in Poland and of of all SO2 and PM emissions, and one-fifth of
inplementation problems under transitional NO, emissions (Nowicki 1992, p. 12).
circumstances. However, we give no Katowice is home to 22 of the 80 most
quantitative estimate of how institutional and polluting enterprises in Poland. As a result, in
social constraints might cause environmental 1989 the annual average concentrations of
policies to fall short of their theoretical S02 and NO1 in the Katowice region
potential; nor do we exhaust all the exceeded the pemiissible standards by a
institutional and policy issues anenable to factor of two while PM exceeded standards
qualitative analysis. This area is at or near the by a factor of four (Coopers & Lybrand
forefront of research in enviromnental Deloitte 1991, Tables 2.7-2.9)-well beyond
economics and is ripe for further research. In the guidelmes proposed by WHO. The
particular, analysis of how altemative means permissible annual average concentration in
of restructuring and managing the power Poland for S02 is 32 jig/m3, and for NO1
sector might affect economiic performance and PM it is 50 pLgfn3 . The WHO guidelines
and environmertal quality deserves a high suggest upper limits for S02 and PM of 60
pnlonlty. pghn3 and 90 pghn 3 , respectively (United
BACKGROUND: ENVIRONMENT Nations Environment Program 1992).AND ENERGY IN POLAND ~~~Table 1.1 compares amnbient air qualityAND ENERGY IN POLAND standards in Poland with the US and
Germany. The comparison makes clear that
Pnviroland ntsuffers ofro centhel disastrousn the Polish standards are significantly tougher
than comparable Western figures
3Table 1.1. Ambient Environmental Standards in Poland, the U.S.A. and Germany
(jLg/m3)
Poland U.S.A. Germany
24 hls. anmual 24 hrs. annual 24 his. annual
Pollutant average. average average average average average
SO2 200W 32 365 80 i 140
NO 2 150 50 -- 100 80
PM 120 50 150 50 150
21150 after 1998.
bLGenan standards for these pollutants are stated in terms of the 98th percentile of te average over any 30-
minute period. The figures for S02 and PM are 400 and 300 respectively. The comparable sulphur figure
for Poland is 600 (440 after 1998).
Sources: Polish figures are taken from the Ordinance of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Natual
Resources and Forestry on the Protecdon of Air Against Pollution, 12 February 1990. U.S. and German
figures are based on calculations by Mr. Shakeb Afsah, World Bank, drawing in part on Cochran and Pielke
(1992).
4Nevertheless, the limited available evidence daily concentrations well in excess of the
(including parallel studies under the World pemiitted amounts (Coopers & Lybrand
Bank's Environmental Action Programme for Deloitte 1991, Tables 2.10-2.13); and
Central and Eastern Europe) suggests that particular problems are created in the older
ambient conditions have imposed important parts of the city of Krakow (Ministry of
burdens on human health, particularly in Environmental Protection 1991).
Upper Silesia and Krakow.2 The non-health Air pollution in Poland is predominantly
impacts also are thought by many to be caused by energy production and use,
significant, though their actual severity is especially coal. Estimates of the precise
subject to dispute. extent of energy's contribution vary, pardy no
Severe smog conditions and high doubt due to differences in definition.
sulphur concentrations in Krakow, the old However, according to estimates made in this
capital of Poland, have had a serious impact study (Appendix 2, Table A23), energy
on the city's residents as well as valuable production and use in 1990 by largc
historic buildings and monuments. In 1990, stationary sources, essentially for electric
the Krakow region was the second most power generation and heat production.
polluted in Poland, next to Katowice (Central accounted for 70-80 percent of the eniissions
Statistical Office 1991, Tablc I). It of PM and S02, and nearly 50 percent of the
experiences smog incidents more than any emissions of NO, The Ministry of
other city in Poland, with S02 concentrations Environmental Protection, Natural Resources
reaching 3000-4000 pLgfm3 ( Nowicki 1992, and Forestry estimated that the energy sector
p. 16). In 1989, the average ambient was responsible for 90 percent of SO2
concentration of S02 in Krakow was 70 emissions, and 60-70 percent of dusts and
jtg/n 3 (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte 1991), NOx (Mnistly of Environmental Protection
morc than twice tie national standad; and 1991, p. 13). Using 1987 data, Siexpinska
the annual average concentration of PM (62 (1991, p. 28) attributes 54 percent of dust
ig/rm3 ) also exceeded the national standard. and 55 percent of gas emissions to the fiel
Sinilarly, in 1989 the maxriurm daiy and power industry; while Wasikiewicz
concentrations exceeded the pennitted (1991, p. 111), with 1988 data, shows 66
amounts by a factor of two (Coopers & percent of S02, 42 percent of NOX and 27
Lybrand Deloitte 1991, Tables 2.10-2.13). percent of dust coning from energy
However, it should be noted that emissions production. Aside from being the main
from the main polluters in Krakow have source of air pollution in Poland, energ
recendy dropped, due in no small measure to provides most (80 percent in 1988) of the
the restructuring of the local industrial base, enissions of carbon dioxide (Nowicki 1992,
and ambient air quality has improved since p. 6).
1987. Average concentations of S02 and An importan undelying cause of
PM in 1991 fell to 67 V±tM3 and 54 Rgft'3 energy's role in air pollution is the fact tht
respectively (Bolek and Wertz 1992). Poland has one of the most energy-intensive
Problems from NOx are believed to be les economies in the world, with heavy
serious than with SO2 and PM, although the dependence on coal and lignite. According to
very limited data which are availab,le point to World Bank data, in 1989 Poland's energy
intensity was 1.889 kgoe per US$ of GDP (at
1987 prices), exceeded only by China at
2Seein parricul; Kimpnick. Harison, NickCll, and 1.915 (Bates and Moore 1992). Using a
TDman (1993).
5slightly different measure, the World 12 percent for oil, 9 percent for gas and 1
Resources Institute put Poland in first place, percent for other fuels (Central Statistical
with 79 MJ per US$ of GNP (at 1987 prices), Office 1992). Among the larger econoniies,
and China second with 76 MJ per US$ of only South Africa was more dependent on
GNP (World Resources Institute 1992, Table coal for its primary energy supply in 1989,
21.2). Of panicular significance is the fact although Bulgaria, North Korea and
that Poland's total primary energy Czechoslovakia were similar (World
requirement per US$ of GDP is about twice Resources Institute 1992-3, Table 21.1).
as much as the average for Westem Europe Coal consumption is particularly concentrated
(Intemational Energy Agency 1990, p. 11). in specific sectors, one of which is electricity,
Comparisons with selected developed which depended on coal for 96 percent of its
countries are even less favorable, as shown in generation in 1989 (60 percent from hard coal
Table 1.2. and 36 percent from lipite). Electricity and
Although the above figures are heat production together accounted for more
aduittedly crude indicators of energy than half the Polish coal market in 1989
intensity, there seems to be little doubt that (Intemational Energy Agency 1990, p. 162).
there has been an underlying structural In consequence, within the energy sector coal
element to Poland's air pollution problem. contributes 82 percent of PM, 90 percent of
This is aggravated by the fact that the Polish S02, 46 percent of NO., and 75 percent of
economy is not only energy intensive, but also CO2 (see Table 1.3). It is not surprising that
coal-intensive. Hard coal and brown coal the emissions intensity of the Polish economy
(lignite) supplied 78 percent of total primary is so much higher tan that of thc US and the
energy requiremnents in 1991, compared with EC (Table 1.4).
Table 1.2. Poland: Energy Intensity Compared with Selected Developed
Countries (kgoe/US$ GDP at 1987 prices)
Cou = 1982 1987 1989
Poland 2.272 1.995 1.889
France 0.232 0.234 0.223
Gennany 0.254 0.248 0.223
Japan 0.175 0.166 0.163
United Kingdom 0.342 0.317 0.288
United States 0.457 0.394 0.406
Source: Bates and Moore (1992), p. 4 3 .
6Table 1.3. Poland: Emissions Balances 1990
S0 2 PM NO, C02
Source
103 03 1% 03 % 103 %
tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes
Coal & lignite 2,542.9 90 1,205.8 82 547.22 46 271.823 75
Petroleum 175.6 6 25.1 2 477.65 40 38,886 11
products _____
Natural Gas _ - 31.14 3 5
Process Emissions 97.8 3 233.1 16 82.15 7 6,250 2
Other 16.2 1 4.0 - 49.43 4 26,185 7
Total 2,832.5 100 1,468.0 100 1,187.59 100 363,577 100
Table 1.4. Poland: Emissions Intensity Compared with EC
(TonnesIUS$millions of GDPj (1989)
Emission: Poland U.S. EC
SO2 58.4 4.0 2.6
NOx 22.1 3.8 2.2
CO2 1,872 170
Source: World Resources Institute (1992), Tables 5.2 and 5.4; and Intermational
Energy Agency (1990).
7At present, vehicles (mobile sources) 6.8 million by 2000 (172 per thousand
contribute less to total emissions than do coal population) and 8.8 nillion (215 per thousand
burning and industrial processes, probably population), compared with 5.3 million in
due to the fact that vehicle ownership is stil 1990. However, the growth in emissions also
relatively low in Poland (138 passenger cars depends on changes in the types and age
per thousand population in 1990, compared distribution of vehicles, as well as on policies
with 410 in France and 360 in the designed to reduce emissions, although such
Netherlands). Even so, vehicles contribute changes in the vehicle stock are expected to
over 30 percent of NOx emissions, 37 percent have a dampening effect on emissions.3
of carbon monoxide, 24 percent of
hydrocarbons, and 35 percent of lead PLAN OF THE STUDY
(Nowicki 1992, p. 22; Wasikiewicz 1991, p.
1 11). They also are probably more significant Chapter 2 provides a brief conceptual
for ambient air quality than these emissions introductior. to the measurement of emission
percentages suggest, since vehicle emissions abatement cost and the differences between
are concentrated in areas of high population conunand-and-control policies and policies
density, such as the center of Krakow, where relying upon economic incentives. Chapter 3
serious constraints are imposed on traffic provides an introduction to the sinulation
planning by the configuration of the old city. framework, while Chapter 4 describes the
Enissions from mobile sources are likely to scenarios we consider. Chapter 5 reports
increase, as the growth rate of passenger results of the simulation analysis. In Chapter
vehicle ownership is high: 7.5 percent per 6 we discuss institutional and other practical
annum in Poland over the period 1980-1990, issues that arise in selecting policy options in
compared with 1.6 percent per annum in Poland. Chapter 7 briefly summarizes our
France. According to the results of this conclusions.
study, the number of private cars will reach
3See Walls (1993) for further discussion. Note also
tdat even with the projected growth in Polish vehicle
ownership. he number of cars per capita will be well
below Westem European experience.
Chapter 2
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Since a central focus in this study is assessing also will lower rents earned by limited factors
the economic cost of emission reduction in of production (producer surplus).
differcnt scenarios, we first define what is Figure 2.1 illustrates these effects in a
cncompassed in the full social cost of simple setting with only one final good, which
emission reduction. We then discuss the we can take to be total energy services. The
potential differences in cost that mnay arise curves SO and SI represent the supply of
with incentive-based policies compared to energy services before and after the
conmmand and control. imposition of stricter pollution standards.
The demand for energy services is
MIEASURING EMISSION ABATEMENT represented by D. With the stricter standaras,
COST and assuming that price cleans the market for
energy services, the price increases from P0
The most obvious source of cost in reducing to Pl and consumption correspondingly
emissions is expenditures on control declines from QO to Ql. Area A in the
equipment and effort. In the context of air diagram represents the cost of compliance
pollution from energy combustion these with tighter standards given the reduced use
expenditures includc investments in direct of energy services. Areas B and C represent
pollution control equipment (such as catalytic losses in consumer and producer surplus
converters and devices for flue gas respectively from the induced drop in energy
desulphurization); fuel switching or fuel services use. The procedures used for
quality improvement (coal washing); and any calculating the analogues of Areas A, B, and
additional cost of investment in energy C in the simulation model of least-cost energy
conversion technologies that give rise to use are discussed in Chapter 3.
lower emissions (such as advanced coal
combustion systems for electrcity COMMAND VERSUS INCENTIVE-
generation). Resources invested in these BASED POLICIES 4
activities are not available for other purposes
and thus constitute part of the opportunity Associated with each technology capable of
cost of pollution control reducing emissions of a particular pollutant is
There also are indirect effects of policy a marginal cost curve that indicates the
that may be important. These arise from the incremental cost of ernission reduction using
fact that, at least in a functioning market that technology. The incremental cost of
system, the additional costs of poUution emission reduction for society as a whole
control will be reflected in higher prices for depends not just on the costs of individual
final goods and services. As a result, technologies but also on the rules goveming
consumers will reduce consumption of more how technologies can be used- In particular,
expensive commodities and experience a loss the incremental cost to society is likely to be
in real well-being; in effect, the real command
of household incomes over goods and 4For further discussion of the topics in this section
services will be reduced. Reduced demands see, e.&, Pearce and Turner (1990) and Tietenberg
(1992).
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Figure 2.1. Social Costs of Emissions Control
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different when command-and-control policies across polluters, even if specific abatement
stipulate actions by poUuters compared to technologies are not required. This is shown
policies that rely upon economic incentives, in Figure 2.3. Suppose that two polluters
such as taxes on emissions or tradable have different costs of abatement because of
emission permits. basic differences in their technologies. Their
These points are illustrated in Figures marginal costs are indicated by MACA and
2.2 and 2.3. Figure 2.2 shows the MACB in the figure. Suppose that the total
construction of a least-cost marginal cost amount of abatement required to be
curve (MACagg) from marginal cost undertaken by A and B is indicated by the
schedules for different abatement length of the horizontal axis in the figure.
technologies (MAC1, MAC2 , MAC3 ). The The total cost of abatement by A and B is
least-cost deployment of technologies is minimized by the distribution of effort where
achieved by successively exhausting all lower- MACA = MACB. For any other distribution
cost efforts, across all technologies, before of effort, total cost could be lowered by
undertaking higher-cost efforts. This is the shifting responsibility away from the polluter
"lower envelope" of the constiment costs of with higher MAC toward the polluter with
different technologies shown. lower MAC.
This also is the outcome that will obtain The outcome with MACA = MACB is
ideally when polluters face economic the one that will be achieved (at least
incentives to reduce emissions without approximately) with incentive-based policies
constraints on the means of compliance. for emission reduction. With an emission tax,
Under these conditions, polluters naturally emitters will only reduce discharges if the
will seek out the least costly control strategies marginal cost of doing so is less than the tax:
in order to minimize total costs of economic given a comrrmon tax across emitters, marginal
activities, including the costs of meeting abatement cost will be equalized at the level
emission limits. If, instead, policy dictates the of the tax. With emission permit trading,
use of a particular technology as the "best polluters will be indifferent between reducing
practicable," then the marginal cost of emiissions and transacting in permits, when
abatement becomes the marginal cost the price of permits equals the marginal cost
associated with the identified technology. In of emission abatement for all finns. Again,
this case some lower-cost options generally marginal costs are equalized at the (common)
will be foregone, and the overall marginal value of the price of permits. In comrast, a
cost of abatement will be increased by the specified distribution of emission reduction
policy constraint.5 effort under conimand and control is likely to
Policy also can raise the overaU raise total cost relative to the outcome with
marginal cost of emission abatement by more flexible incentive-based policies.6
prescribing a distribution of abatement effort
5 In many cases, required technologies are not actually 6Our focus heie is on emission control However, the
specified in law, but polluters a: required to show ultimate goal of poUution control is improving
that they have achieved emissions reductions at least ambient air quality. When pollutants do not mix
as large as those obtained with some specified unifornly in the atmosphere, location of emissions
technologies Under such circumstances. polluters matters in deternining the effect of different emission
often are drawn in practice to the reference reductions on air quality This is true in varying
technologies unless other options are much cheaper, degrees for aUl the poUutants we consider. As pointed
if only to avoid the extra buiden of proof that comes out in Chapter 6. this considerably complicates the
with deviating from the benchmark control strategies. design of effective policy.
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In addition to static efficiency gains, supplies. With emission charges, lower
incentive-based policies convey dynamic abatement cost allows polluters tO reduce
benefits by rewarding the introduction of costs by engaging in more abatement effort,
lower-cost pollution abatement technologies. in order to avoid the tax. [n contrast, rigid
Such technical progress allows polluters to approaches provide little incentive for
expand abatement in cost-effective ways and technical innovation, particularly when the
reduce permit purchases or increase pemiit controls specify the means for abatement.
Chapter 3
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Analyzing the effects of policies to control Using these indexing conventions.
energy-related air pollution requires a define:
description of energy service demands and the
ways those demands are satisfied. Total Akj = level of activity k in sector j;
pollution discharges will reflect the total Tmkj = share of Akj achieved with
demands for different energy types and the technology m;
ways in which energy services are provided. Fmkj = energy intensity of technology m in
We first describe the process of detenrining pursuing Akf,
time paths of final energy demands in the Simkj = share of fmal energy type i used with
simulations. The second part of the chapter technology m in pursuing Akj.
describes the simulation of least-cost energy
supply decisions. We conclude by returning An example may be useful ir
to the issue of how the social cost of interpreting these symbols. Suppose j =
abatement can be measured using the outputs ferrous metallurgy, and A,j = basic steel
of the model.'7 output measured in tonnes (as opposed to,
say, rolled products using basic ingots as an
FINAL ENERGY DEMAND input). The technology index m refers to
CALCULATIONS different technologies for ingot production
(oxygen furnace versus open hearth), so the
Total final energy demand in the economy Tmkj are the shares of total ingot output
ultimately depends on the level of economic produced by different technologies and F
activities in different sectors and the energy are the energy intensities of the processes.
intensities of these activities. Energy The Tnj are pure numbers between zero and
intensities will vary across altemative one, while the F;gk reflect energy applied per
technologies that can be used to accomplish unit output (e.g., PJ/tonne). The Simnj are
the economic activities under consideration. the shares of different final energy types per
Projection of final energy demands requires unit of total energy application in the
projection of all these component influences. processes (e.g., PJ of coal, gas, or electricity
To express these ideas more formally, per PJ total energy input). Another example
suppose the economy is divided into j = 1, ... , can be given in terms of transport, where the
J sectors. Within each sector j there are k = Akj represent different levels of transport
1, ..., Kj activities, each involving some activities, the Tmkj represent different vehicle
energy use. Suppose further that each types or modes, and the Fntj represent fuel
activity k can be pursued through the use of efficiencies.
m = 1, , . - Mk technologies. Finally, suppose With this notation, the following energy
each technology uses some subset of final quantities can be defined:
energy typesi= l,...,I1
Ei,jkj = total amount of energy type i used by
technology m for activity k in sector j
7Additional discussion of the model can be found in
Cofala (1985) and Cofala et al (1990).
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= AkjTmkjFmkjSimkj (3.1) industrial economy. It is almost
inconceivable for a transitional economy.
Eqy = total sector j demand for energy type Thus, we have been forced to rely upon
more heuristic projections of the composition
of Polish economic activity, prepared by a
Ki Mk variety of sectoral experts consulted by
= X XEimkj (3.2) members of our research team from the
k=lm=l Polish Academy. These compositional
projections are combined with World Bank
Ei = aggregate demand for energy type i macroeconomic forecasts and other
judgments to develop the Akj. Starting with
a base year of 1990, projections are made atX Ei1 (3.3) five-year intervals to 2015.
j=1 Similar problems arise in projecting
choices of energy-using technologies, choices
Ej = total energy demand in sector j of fuel types, and trends in energy intensity.
Technology and fuel type shares are specified
it heuristically using sector experts' judgments.
= XEiJ (3.4) Base Case energy intensities and thus total
i=I energy requirements also are calculated in this
way (the Base Case is described further in the
Note that a time subscript has been next chapter). The expert judgments include
suppressed in this formulation. In practice, assessments of how the size and composition
all the components of final energy use will of energy demand will respond to higher
vary over time. Economic activity and energy prices and economic restrucuring.
technology choices in the industry, transport No effort is made to link changes over time in
and other sectors will change in response to Base Case energy demands to assumed
general economic restructuring and increased energy pnce trends and simple (point)
energy prices. Fuel choices and energy elasticities, out of fear that such calculations
intensity sinilarly will respond to changing would give misleading or implausible answers
economic incentives-in particular to in light of the large energy price increases
incentives for energy conservation. Poland has faced and the massive change in
To operationalize this framework the structure of energy use that is occurring.
requires projecting each component in Past experience provides little guidance in
equatior (3.1) over time, which is donc here assessing these changes given the size of the
in two steps. The first step is projecting price increases and the fact that conventional
energy-using activity levels in the economy market responses did not operate in Poland in
(the A . Projecting these activities requires the past.
the ana;yst to take a view on how the entire On the other hand, our approach to
structure of the Polish economy will evolve. calculating Base Case energy demands has a
In principle, this could be done with a potentially serious drawback in the policy
dynamic general equilibrium model dtat scenarios. As noted in Chapter 2, one
included invesunent behavior, trade linkages, element of the social cost of abatement is the
and macroeconomic effects. However, such a reduction in consumer surplus when
ramework is daunting even for an advanced abatement expenditures raise the price of
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cnergy services and other commodities. factors are used to express enissions as a
Without some allowance for a response of function of total activity.
energy demands to higher prices, the Process emission factors for S0 2 and
capability to include this effect in the social NO, are used to describe emissions from
abatement cost calculation is lost. production of agglomerate, pig iron, raw steel
To ameliorate this problem, in the (from open hearth and oxygen furnaces),
policy scenarios we adjust energy demands copper, cement, nitric acid, and nitrogenous
relative to the Base Case by using a set of fertilizers. Process emission factors also are
simple own-price elasticity assumptions for used for keeping track of particulates, since
broad energy categories, along with estimates PM emissions depend on how coal is
of delivered pricc, increases reflecting combusted. Emiissions from the transport
abatement costs, pollution charges, or prices sector also vary across the policy scenarios,
for traded permnits bome by energy service given different assumptions about the
suppliers. In light of significant uncertainties imposition of control measures, e.g., catalytic
about cross-price effects, we make no effort converters. These options are described in
to include them. The demand adjustment is the next chapter.
made iteratively. First, energy supply costs
are calculated under a policy scenario with LEAST-COST ENERGY SUPPLY
the Base Case demands. The calculated
increases in delivered energy costs over the Many final energy types can be supplied in a
Base Case are used with the elasticities to variety of ways. This is obvious in the case of
adjust demands. Then the new demands are electricity and district heat, but it also applies
used to rerun the energy supply module for example to coal (which can be extracted
described below. In practice, only one or two from different domestic mines or imported).
iterations are needed to get convergence.8 Different supply options have associated with
Along with projecting final energy them different costs and air emissions.
demands, this part of the analytical Moreover, there are intertemporal links
framework keeps track of air emissions from among supply decisions-to cite an obvious
final energy use in different economic example, a decision to invest in new power
activities. (Emissions from energy conversion plant capacity has consequences for the costs
are tracked in the optimization part of the of meeting future electricity demands.
model described below.) In many cases, Once final energy demands are
emissions follow directly from the quantity projected, the means for satisfying hese
and type of fuel used. In other cases, demands are detennined as the solution of a
however, emissions depend on the process dynamic linear programmming algorithm that
used as well as the fuel. For example, sulphur minmizes the present value of supplying the
from fuel may be absorbed in cement specified energy demands, subject to specified
production, while additional sulphu beyond emission constraints and constraints inposed
that in fuel may be released in copper by the capital stock. The nature of the
production. In these cases, process emission emission constraints depends on the policy
scenario being considered, as discussed in the
8As described in the next chapter, ;be iteraWon next chapter.
process is more intricate when demands must be Te model includes as decision variables
adjusted to reflect delivered cost increases and both the operation of existing plant and
amission charges must be adjusted to satisfy specified equipment and investment in new equipment,
emission targets.
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including investment in cleaner new plant or prevailing enviromnental constrainmts, and a
environmental retrofit. Existing plant may sequence of capital investments over dme.
also be scrapped before it is fully depreciated. This sequence reflects changes in demand and
Because the sequences of energy supply and environmental constraints, along with the
conversion activities are the solution of a dynamics of capacity depreciation or
dynamnic optinization problem, they take into scrappage and exogenously specified limnits on
account the intertemporal linkages among total investment resources.
decisions noted above. Minimization of the present value cost
Over 70 technologies and 22 primary of energy supplies is the outcome achieved by
energy types are included in the framework, an ideal competitive market. Thus, an
including energy imports and exports. urtportant assumption in our use of the cost-
Among the most important energy conversion nim on model is that actual energy
processes considered are coal and lignite fixed markets in Poland wil perform effectively
power plants, combined heat and power over the rime horizon. In pardcular, we are
plants, district heating plants, and power or assumingthat prices reflect full margial costs
heating plants operated by industria of energy supplies and tat individual enery
concems. Enviromnental abatement options suppliers respond cost-effectively to these
include hard coal cleaning, wet and dry price signals. These assumptions seem
process flue gas desulphurization in coal and reasonable, as noted in Chapters 4 and 6,
lignite plants, flue gas denitrification, and although some government regulation of the
particulate collectors (bag filters and energy sector (especially electricity) and
electrostatic precipitators). Other options subsidization of energy producers (e.g., high-
include new investnent in low-emission cost coal nmines) occurs even in advanced
energy conversion processes, such as gas industr countries."
combined cycle plants, coal-buming fluidized It should also be noted that the energy
bed plants, coal gasification, and residual oil supply and conversion model, and the energy
gasification. denand projections, are deteministic. A
The optimization model includes capital non-stochastic approach is a disadvantage for
costs and fuel and operatng costs for both our policy analysis, in that we cannot explore
primary fuel production and energy differences in the performance of emission
conversion processes.9 Production and fees and permnit systems in the presence of
conversion capacities constrain utilization of uncertainty about emissions and abatement
facilities in any period, based on assumed costs.12 We regard this as an important
capacity availability factors.'0 The model subject for further research.
solution provides both a "merit order" for
technology use in any period, subject to IMoAwer impont concer is whether the levels of
investment calculated by the model are feasble in the
9To limit a bias in he model away from capital- capital-stapped Polish economy. Investment levels
intensive outcomnes in periods toward ibe end c. the implied by tue model are discussed in Chapter 5.
decision horizon, capital costs include only the 12With enissiou fees, the equilibrium marginal cost
amount of investment that is depreciable under of abatement (equal to the tax) is predetermined but
normal conditions within the horizon. In addition, emissions are aOL The opposite is true with permit
rsults in Chapter S are reported only to 2010 to avoid trading. The outcomes with fees and pesmits
end period bias. therefor diverges in the presence of uncertainties
10Tbese factors rauge from 0.74 for new coal power about emisions and costs (see Weitzman 1974 for
plants down to 05 or less for combined Feat and fortber disussion). The complexity of the model
power plants. used bere precluded even a ess dirct assemnewn of
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MEASURING SOCIAL COSTS OF ACS. Using the definition of demand
ABATEMENT elasticity, this loss can be approximated by
Having introduced the simulation framework, 2
we now return to the issue of how the so ACS=O.5(Q 0 -Q')NP 0IQ(I/ED) (3.5)
cost of polution abatement can be calculated
using the mode. To do this we refer again to where CD is the absolute value of he price
Figure 2.1. The social cost in that figure is elasicity of energy dad given by the
represented as Area (A+B+C). cure D.
Suppose first that So rpresents the The above argument applies only to the
aggregate marinal cost curve of energy fiTmsition of fixed standards on large
supply in the Base Casc, without newly stationary sources in the opdmizaion model.
instituted controls. The area under SO outeo However, it tsily erized to other
the Base Case consumption level QO, Area policy scenarios. For example, with emission
(E+F), is the Base Case value of the objective or fuel taxes the schedule S1 is the marginal
function being mninimized in the opimization cost of energy supply, including the tax. To
model described above. Now suppose that detemiine the social cost of pollution control,
51 is the aggregate marginal cost curve for it is then necessary to net out government tax
energy supply, with some set of revenues (a transfer paynent).' 3 In addition,
enneronmental standards applied to the large some pollution control measures are imposed
stationary sources included in tle on final energy demands rather than on
optimization model. The area under dzc prmary energy production and conversion.
curve Sl out to the new consumption levcl Impoytant examples of such controls in his
Q1, Area (A+E), is the new value of the stu+r are rstrictions on household coal use
objective funimon in opmizadon. Tlhe and vaious transportation measures like
difference betwen the two values of f catalytic converter requirments. These costs
objecive finction thus is Area (A) are calculated separtly and added to control
Area (F). If we add to dtis the amount costs indicated by the optimization model.
PO(QO-Q1 ) = Area (F+C), the value of
rduced energy use at the original prie P0,
the result is Area (A+C).
We have thus far shown that two of fte
three components needed to measme the
social cost of imposing abatement standards
on large stationary sources-increases in
costs of farginal energy supply and a
drop in producer surplus fromn reduced energy
use--ca be recovered direcdy from thc
optimization model plus a simple aridtnedc
adjustment. The third component, the
consumer suplus loss, is represented by the
area of tiangle B. We denote this cost by
t3No sucb netng is needed with emso tading
uncertain pact thogh sensitivity analysis (we when permits ae anifadhred to sourc and no
Dowlatabadi and Toman 1991 for an ilustaton). revenue is transfend to the govemmeaL
Chapter 4
DESIGN OF SCENARIOS
We describe the basic economic assumprions economy. It shows substantial projected
underlying the model runs in the first section; declines m ferrous metallurgy and relaively
the different sets of environmental standards static behavior in other industres, while home
exnamined in the study in the second section; construction and private vehicles expand
and, in the third and final section of the considerably. These assumed changes reflect
chapter, we describe the different economnic the judgments of various Polish experts based
policy scenarios examined, as alternative on official national statistics, assessments of
means to meet a particular set of standards. sectoral perfornance, and demographic
Detailed numerical infornation on the assumptions (population change, household
scenarios can be found in Appendix I (Tables formation).
Al.l-Al.15). Energy prices are the other key element
needed to establish the scenarios. Projections
BASIC ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS of intemational prices for (traded) primary
fuel types used in the simulations are shown
Table Al.l lists the basic economic output in Table A1.3. These are broadly consistent
projections on which the energy analyses rely. with World Bank and other international
Total GNP in 1995 is assumed to be five projections. Over 1990-2010, world crude
percent above the 1990 level, reflecting oil prices are projected to rise by about 50
recovery from the output shock of the early percent; coal prices by about 20 percent; and
1990s. GNP then grows at about 4.5 percent gas prices by around 40 percent.
each year until 2000, a figure consistent with Domestic energy prices to end-users
projections by the World Bank and by the depend on interaonal prices, domestic
Polish Ministry of Industry and Trade primary production costs, conversion costs
(Bojarski et al. 1992). After 2000, a four for electricity and district heat, delivery costs
percent annual growth rate is assumed (particularly transmission and distribution
(Cohen 1991), a relatively moderate costs for the network energy sources-
assumption (Rolo and Stem 1992 propose 5 electrcity, district heat, and gas), excise
percent annual growth in their "optimistic" taxes, and on assumptions about economic
scenario). pricing of energy to end-users. Prior to 1990,
Substal change in the structure of energ prices in Poland were far below
the economy also is assumed. Table Al.1 economic costs. Over the subsequent two
shows projections of a considerable decline in years, considerable progress has been made in
industn's share of GNP, along with rationalizing energy pnces Energy prices to
significant decLines in construction, while industry by mid-1992 were at or close to
"other" (the service sector) grows economic costs. Mine-mouth coal prices
substantially.14 Table All2 looks in more were at export parity, and liquid fuel prices
detail at energy-intensive sectors of the reflected al production and delivery costs. as
well as substantial taxes in the latter case.
1*4 he projections are based on nationa income Prices of network fuels to households in mid-
accounting convetons derived fm the previous 1992, while well above 1990 levels, still
economic regime, which placed lide emphasis on
meanring services.
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needed to increase another 50-100 percent to ALTERNATIVE EMISSION
reflect economic costs. STANDARDS
A basic assumption underlying the
study, as noted in Chapter 3, is that fiul In the Base Case scenario (BASE) no new
economic pricing of all final energy sources environnmental policies are employed, but
wil be in place by 1995: price is assumed to some policies in non-energy industries that
reflect the full marginal cost of supply plus reflect both better resource management and
any excise taxes that are applied. We also lower emissions are continued (e.g., in
assume that taxes on liquid fuels, in metallurgy and cement manufacturing). In
percentage terms, wil rise to Westem the transport sector, a new generation of
European norms by 1995. These assumptions diesel engines, with emissions comparable to
generate the projections of final energy prices current West European standards, is
shown in Table Al.4; Table A1.5 records the introduced (tough existing trucks do not
delivery and tax markups. The prices in face accelerated phaseout). These engines
Table A1A underlie the projection of final produce 20 percent less NOx than engines
energy demands in the Base Case, without curnendy used in Poland.
additional environmental initiatives that Relative to the Base Case, four different
elevate prices. For the network energy sets of standards are considered. We label
sources, the prices are broadly consistent with these Polish "Command-and-Control"
economic costs calculated by the supply Standards, European Community Standards,
optinization part of the model described in German Standards, and Flat Rate Reductions.
Chapter 3.15
Environmental policies that raise Polish "Command-and-Control" Standards
delivered final energy prices relative to the (CAC)
Base Case also reduce demands relative to
the Base Case. The own-price dasticities The CAC scenano mposes plant level
used to make these aemand adjusments are performance standards for large stationary
shown in Table A1.6 (as alkady noted, cross- sources (expressed in pollutants per uit fuel
price effects are ignored). These figures in input), consistent with limits defined in 1990
Table A1.6 are broadly consistent with other by the Ministry of Environmental Protection,
estimates of long-run elasticities (Bohi 1981, Natural Resources and Forestry hi its
Bates and Moore 1992). We emphasize that Ordinance on the Protection of Air Against
the elasticities shown are not used to obtain Pollution. The lmits on SO2 , NO., and PM
the time path of Base Case demand from stationary sources are shown i Tables
adjustments, given the sharp price increases Al.7-AI.9. The standards for "new'
since 1990. installations (begun after the Ordinance and
put into operation after 1994) start in 1995.
Existing sources must meet weaker interim
standards until 2000, the second year
I iManOna cos isna easa defime in a mlticmreported in the projection analysis, after
'
5 Margial cost is not easily defined in a multioniput whtichi they must meet standards thar are
multiperiod linear programming model in which tich than the inte standards bta ake
small changes in activity levels can have nonmargmnal
effects on the dual variables. Nevenheless, the than the new-source standards (in the
in Table Al .4 can be shown essentially to cover the Ordinance, the actual changeover year is
fuR market costs of enargy supply in the absence of 1998). The nature of these standards is
requirements for emission abatement.
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spelled out below.'6 Note that these arc plant European Community Standards (EEC)
level standards, so some intraplant emission
trading across sources is assumed to be The EEC scenario uses target reductions in
possible even in this case. S02 and NOx emnissions from existing
In addition to stationary source sources that are embodied in the 1988 EC
controls, our CAC scenario includes a Large Combustion Plant Directive (IEA
number of regulations for the household and 1992). These call for SO2 reductions of 25
transport sectors which, while plausible, have percent by 1993, 43 percent by 1995, and 60
not yet been incorporated in Polish percent by 2003. NO1 reductions from
environmental policy: a ban on urban coal existing sources are to be 20 percent by 1993
use by households and a requirement for and 36 percent by 1998. In the model, the
catalytic converters on all cars. These S02 reductions are applied to Poland in
restrictions are phased in to be 50 percent 1995, 2000, and 2005 respectively; the NO1
effective in 2000 and 100 percent effective in reductions are applied in 1995 and 2000.
2005. After 2000, an additional 30 percent In addition to existing source controls,
reduction in heavy diesel engine emissions the EEC scenario includes controls on new
also is imnposed, in line with US norms, and stationary sources. These standards are
the sulphur content of diesel oil is assumed to country-specific, but typical standards are as
drop from 0.6 percent to 0.15 percent. shown in Tables Al.10-Al.12.1 They are
It is important to note that our assumed to apply starting in the frt
application of the Polish large source projection year, 1995. Finally, the ban on
standards is at the plant level, rather than at urban coal use and the catalytic converter
the level of individual sources (e.g., boilers) requirement in CAC are carried over to EEC.
as the standards are originally stated,17 To simplify computations, we set final
reflecting the fact that the model is concerned demand in EEC at CAC levels, ignoring how
with types of plants rather than separate icreases in final energy price relative to CAC
sources within plants. In applying the affect demand.
standards at the plant level we implicitly
assume a capacity for trading emission German Standards (GER)
reductions across sources within plants. As
discussed in Chapter 6, this appears to be The GER scenario is similar to EEC but with
consistent with how the Ministry's 1990 a different set of large plant constraints, as
Ordinance currently is being interpreted in shown in Tables Al.13-Al.15 Existing
Poland. Note also that with this definition of plants can meet interim SO2 standards until
CAC, the scenario with S0 2 emissions 1993, after which they must be retrofitted to
trading defined below should be interpreted meet new plant standards or closed. In
as involving trading among as well as witiin
plants. I'EC and German standards are actually expressed in
mg/Nm3 of exhaust gas, which refers to cubic meters
161n practice there is a third category of plant. e.g.. of dry gas at 0°C and 1 atmosphere of pressure. To
those started before the Ordinance was passed but put make the standards comparable to Polish limits,
into service afterwards, which must meet the old- conversion factors of I mg/Nm3 - 035 g/GJ fuel
source fuel standards as interim standards but convert input for coal plants, I mg/Nm3 = 0.30 g/GJ fuel
to new-source standards by 1998. input for oil plants, and 1 mg/Nm3 - 0.31 gIGJ fuel
1'7This also applies to our scenarios with European input for gas plants were assumed. These ar
Community and Gennan emissions standards approximate conversions that ignore many differeuces
defined below. in fuel quality and technology.
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adapting the S02 standards to Polish Polish NOx standards are stricter than
application we apply interim standards to EC and even German standards, particularly
existing plant in 1995 and tougher standards for grate firing coal plants and small gas fired
in 2000 and subsequent projection years. plants. For PM, in contrast, Polish standards
New plants have to meet tougher standards are much more liberal; generally, PM control
starting in 1995. The GER NO, and is much less of a problem in Western
particulate standards also must be met by European countries. These characteristics of
1995. As in EEC, final energy demands are the control scenarios should be kept in mind
left at the CAC level. since PM often is the cheapest pollutant to
abate. As already noted, tne main difference
Flat Rate Reductions (FRRED) between CAC and FRRED is that the latter
does not discriminate among sources based
The Polish CAC and the other two sets of on size or vintage.
standards impose differential constraints on These differences in plant-level
large sources; for example, new sources must standards influence the total emissions
meet more stringent S02 standards than projected in the different control scenarios
existing sources. With FRRED, we aim for just described.20 However, they are by no
the samne total emissions as in CAC (and leave means the only factor. Nor are they a reliable
final energy demands unchanged), but we guide even to the comparison of total
allocate allowable emnissions over time for emissions from new and old sources. Other
each large source type in proportion to its influences include the distribution of plant by
contribution to unabated emissions in fiel type and age, and the relative cost of
BASE.'9 The comparison of CAC and different control strategies. These
ERRED thus can reveal the cost compaisons are discussed in Chapter 5.
consequences of differential treatrnent of
large sources. ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS
Comparison of Plant-Level Emission
Standards The second set of scenarios we consider
involves the application of different types of
With respect to S02, EC and (especially) economic policy instruments. With one
German plant-level standards are much exception, these scenarios seek to achieve the
stricter than Polish standards for large new same total emissions as those projected in
facilities. Much the same is true for existing CAC (based in part on 1990 Polish legal
plant. In contrast, for small new facilities standards).
(e.g., mechanical grate and other boilers with
capacities less than 100 MWth), Polish Uniform Emissions Taxes on Large
standards tend to be tougher (compare, e.g., Sationary Sources (ETAXI)
the Polish limit of 22 g/GJ for new
mechanical grate boilers to the German ETAX1 is based on the same final energy
standard of 700 g/GJ for small boilers). demands as CAC, including the ban on urban
coal use and the restictions on transport
ETiissions (e.g., catalytic converter
IThbis is the case for both existiang enmitters at the
start of the simulation and new emitters added during 2t0 hey also allow us to account for how new source
the simulation. bias may affect the pattem nf plant invesmenL
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requirements). From this starting point, emitters face a declining sequence of
emissions taxes on large-source eniissions of endowments over time, consistent with the
S02, NOx, and PM are found that yield the time path of eniissions in CAC (see Chapter
same national emnissions as CAC. Because 5). New eminters must acquire permits to
final demands are the same as CAC. this case cover all their emissions, starting from their
indicates the effect on total abatement costs initial years of operation.23
of more flexible large-source emission
controls compared to fixed plant-level Coal Tax (COAL TX)
standards. 2 1
COALTX, a 100 percent tax on coal, the
SO2 Trading by Large Sources (S02TR) most polluting fuel, is imposed (coke, a
smokeless fuel, is exempted). No regulatory
SO2TR uses the samne starting point as restrictions on emissions (in energy
ETAXI (CAC final energy demands, ban on conversion, households, or transport) are
urban coal use, transport controls). It also imposed, and no attempt is made to achieve
imposes the CAC plant-level standards for emissions parity with CAC. Total final
NOx and PM. For large-source SO2 control demands also differ from CAC; they are
(all the sources in the optimization model), a calculated by altering BASE demands to
national market for S02 permits is simulated reflect the effects of the tax on prices of coal,
by solving the optimization model with a limit electricity, and heat.
only on aggregate S02 enmissions (versus
plant-level standards that allow only trading Uniform Emission Taxes on All Sources
among sources within plants). Allowances (ETAX2)
are not bankable (so we are not simulating an
intertemporally first-best SO2 trading system ETAX2 relaxes all fuxed standards and
that would allow more irregular enmissions controls, including those on households and
over time). 2 2 transport, while imposing SO2 , N0x. and PM
To calculate compliance costs for emission taxes on all sources to yield the
traders, initial permit allocations are same total emissicns as CAC. Large energy-
grandfathered to existing emitters in 1990 conversion sources respond to taxes in the
based on 1990 emissions shares. Existing optimization model as in ETAX 1. Household
transport and other end-use emissions are
21Note that because the model does not distinguish curbed by higher fuel taxes, set to be
the location of pollution sources, this scenario equivalent to the large-source emission taxes,
generates uniforrn national emission tax rates foT based on the average emissions per unit of
large-source emissions of NOx and PM as well as fuel use.24 Compared to ETAX1 this
502. Such uniform taxes are not socially optimal
from the standpoint of pollution control since the
pollutants in question do not mix uniformly at a 23Th. total emission er4owment is not quite the same
national level and different regional control severities as total CAC emissions because certain small sources
generally are appropriate to reflect variations in -such as municipal beating plants and some sources
ambient conditions. ETAX1 should be interpreted of process emissions-are omitted from trading.
only in mrlation to CAC, not as an endorsement of 24This scenario requires a two-level set of iterations.
uniforn emission tax rates. For any set of final demands. enission taxes ame
22SO2TR also does not allow for trading between varied within the energy conversion optimization
energy converters and final demanders (e.g., a local model until total emissions are (approximaLely) equal
power plant paying to reduce emissions from to CAC levels. The "outer feedback loop" involves
household coal use by subsidizing fuel substitution). successive revisions of final demand, starting at
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scenario allows for a different distribution of SUMMARY
emission control between the large stationary
sources and other emitters since the latter Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize important
also are subject to incentive-based characteristics of all the standards and
instruments. Options for end-use fuel and economic policy scenarios we consider. As
technology switching (e.g., voluntary shifts to alrady noted, the structure of the model
catalytic converters or gas use in households) forces on us some compromises in defining
that might be induced by high fuel taxes are policy scenarios that correspond to actual
ignored. Such substitution possibilities lie policy design issues. Nevertheless, we
beyond the scope of the model. At least in believe that the scenarios are capable of
the transport sector, there is reason to suspect illustrating both the incremental costs of
that such switching would not be cost- different standards and the cost consequences
effective for the tax levels we impose (see of different economic policy mechanisms.
Chapter 5). The comparisons are made in the next
chapter.
BASE levels, to eflect the effects of the emissions
taxes. As a consistency check the optimnization model
was run with only aggregate emission constraints (as
if there were a single market for all sources to rade
emissions). This outcome should be the theoretical
dual to uniform emission taxes on all sources set to
yield the same total emissions. In practice the result
in the consistency check was essentially the same as
in ETAX2, taking into account the inevitable
rounding prDblems.
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Table 4.1. Characteristics of Alternative Standards Scenarios
CAC FRRED EEC GER
Baseline final energy BASE CAC CAC CAC
demand
Demand adjustment for Yes Yes No No
incremental cnergy (reflecting
price increase relative different
to baseline distribution
of control
effort)
Nature of stationary Plant level Plant level Plant level Plant level
source emission (Tables (Pro rata (Tables (Tables
standards A1.7-AI.9) reductions A.1O-Al.12) A1.13-AI .15)
relative to
BASE;
total
emissions
same as
CAC)
Household and Yes Yes Yes Yes
transport sector
controls
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Table 4.2. Characteristics of CAC and Alternative Economic Instrument Scenarios
| CAC ErAXI S02TR ETAX2 COALTX
Baseline BASE CAC CAC BASE BASE
final energy
demand
Demand Yes No No Yes Yes
adjustment
for
incremental
energy price
increase
relative to
baseline
Nature of Plant level None; CAC plant None; None (coal
stationary (Tables national sids for NO ' national denand
source Al.7-Al.9) emissions PM; nationa emissions taxed)
emnission targets = so0 targets =
standards CAC emissions CAC
emissions target = CAC emissions
emissions
Htuitsehold Yes Yes Yes No (fuels are No (coal
and taxed based use taxed)
transport on average
sector emissions per
controls Ulit)
Chapter 5
MODEL RESULTS
We present in this chapter a summary of the Corresponding declines in coal and lignite
most significant results derived from the shares, and increases in oil and gas, are
simulations. Details can be found in obverved in primary demand.
Appendix 2 (Tables A2.l-A2.14). Table A2.3 lists Base Case emissions by
type and sector. Except for C02, all of the
BASE CASE SCENARIO aggregate emissions are lower in 2010 tlhan in
1988. The declines by 2010 are 7 percent for
Table A2.1 sumnrnarizes information about the S02, 3 percent for NO,t and 44 percent for
time paths of energy demand in the Base PM compared to 1988. PM emissions decline
Case. GNP in 2000 is somewhat above the monotonically, while S02 and NO, increase
1988 level, but both primary and final energy after 2000 but still do not return to 1988
demands remain considerably below 1988 levels. Concerning trends in the distribution
values; energy intensity contracts by 20 of emiissions by sector, PM drops fairly
percent over 1988-2000. Even in 2010. when consistently across sectors, whereas the fall in
GNP is well above the 1988 level, the NO, and S02 occurs in final use and in
continued drop in energy intensity of GNP industrial boilers. Some technological factors
leads to a much lower growth in total energy help to explain the patterns in Table A2.3:
demands (energy intensity in 2010 is 40 improved diesel engines, with 20 percent
percent less than in 1988).25 Table A2.2 decreases in NOx emissions, enter the
amplifies this point by showing relative scenario, and particulate emissions drop from
changes in sectoral energy intensities. better control in some industrial processes
Although energy intensity in the residential and a limited shift toward coal beneficiation
sector retums to the 1988 level in 2000, and (even without new environmental controls).
rises slightly thereafter, heated dwelling space
is projected to increase over 40 percent ENER(;Y AND EMISSIONS
relative to 1988, so that residential energy per DIFFERENCES ACROSS STANDARDS
m3 of living area actually declines. In all SCENARIOS
other sectors, energy use per unit of value
added declines, even after recovery from the We consider here the impacts of different
output contraction of the early 1990s. environmental standards (CAC. EEC, GER,
Significant changes also are observed in and FRRED) Final energy demand in CAC
the structure of energy demands. As shown (and thus in the other scenarios just listed) is
in Table A2.1, the share of final demand for lower than in BASE, as a consequence of
solid fuels drops sharply, while gas, liquid higher prices from environmental controls,
fuels, and electricity increase their shares.26 but the difference is minor-only 2-3
percent.27 Thus. we focus here on primary
25Over 1988-2010, the elasticity of final energy
demnand with respect to GNP is only 0.12. much lower elasticity of electricity demand with respect to GNP
than comparable experience in Western economies. over 1988-2010 is still only 0.8. well below past
2 6Note that the relative electricity intensity of GNP patterns in Western economies.
remains well above overall energy intensity (and even 27Recall Erom Table 4.1 that by assumpfion. final
increases during the early 1990s). Nevertheless. the demands in EEC and GER are the same as in CAC.
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energy demands, where the differences are 40-50 percent, 30-35 percent and 30 percent
still modest but slightly more pronounced. below CAC respectively.
Table A2.4 summarizes the results for It is also interesting to note differences
primary energy demands. Coal demand in across scenarios in the sources of emission
CAC is about four percent lower than in reductions in Table A2.5. For S02
BASE in 2010, while gas demand is about reductions, all the control scenarios except
eight percent higher. As expected, ERRED put a greater burden relative to
environmental standards make a switch BASE on new sources than existing sources:
toward lower-emitting fuel more attractive, a whereas new power and combined heat and
phenomenon that is even more pronounced in power plants in BASE and FRRED are
FRRED. While total primary energy demand responsible for 10 percent of S02 emissions
and its sectoral pattem under EEC are very in 2000 and 28 percent of cmissions in 2010,
similar to CAC, there is greater switching to they generate only 2 percent of S02
lower-emitting sources with the stricter emissions in 2000 and 6-8 percent of
German standards. It is interesting to note emissions in 2010 under CAC, EEC, and
that the Gennan standards require more GER.
primary energy than the simple pro rata
enmission reductions in FRRED, to achieve the ENERGY AND EMISSIONS
same final energy demands, reflecting the DIFFERENCES ACROSS ECONOMIC
need for greater primary energy application to POLICY SCENARIOS
achieve the tighter GER standards (e.g.,
through flue gas desulphurization). We next consider variations between CAC
Table A2.5 shows the trajectories of and scenarios involving economic policy
emissions by source and type with the various instruments. Table A2.6 indicates that the
standards. We noted in the previous effects of economic incentives on primary
subsection that, with the exception of C02, energy demands are minor, in the case of
emissions in BASE (without new ETAXI and SO2TR. With regard to
environmental initiatives) fall off considerably emissions, the main interest lies in the
Telative to 1988 levels. In CAC, the new distribution of emissions across sources, since
Polish legal standards produce a further the aggregates are (essentially) identical by
substantial drop in emissions, again with the construction.28 A more striking feature of
exception of C0 2 . In 2000, SO2 and NOx EITAXl and S02TR, as shown in Table A2.7,
ermissions decline by roughly a quarter is the alleviation of new source bias for SO2
relative to BASE, while PM declines by about in ETAXI and S02TR-new sources in
a half In EEC, the S02 and NO reductions these scenarios have significantly higher S02
are similar to those in CAC out to 2000, emissions than in CAC. The other major
while PM emissions are about 20 percent difference across the scenarios is that with the
lower; however, by 2010, S02 emissions are greater 502 control flexibility in SO2TR and
12 percent lower than CAC while NO, is ETAX1, more SO2 abatement is undertaken
about 2 percent higher. The GER controls on by power plants and less by combined heat
S0 2 , NO1 , and PM are truly stringent, and power plants relative to CAC. The
yielding emissions in 2000 and 2010 that are differences in NO, and PM abatement
'in some cases the iterative solution process over
There are final demand differences between CAC and multiple periods does not generate exact agreement in
FRRED, but they are minor. msults that in theory should be identical.
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between ETAXI and CAC arc minor, However, emissions of S02, NOX, and PM
suggesting that any cost advantages from are much higher relying just on the coal tax
incentive-based control by large stationary an with more b^oad-based envirom-nental
sources derive prmarily from flexibility m policies.
S02 control.
Tables A2.8 and A2.9 show the energy ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EMISSION
and environmental pattems for ETAX2, in CONTROLS
which large stationary sources face emissions
taxes, and other sources (household and Tables 5.1 and 5.2 compare the social costs
transport) face (roughly) equivalent fuel of abatement across the CAC and economic
taxes, reflecting the average emissions per instrument scenarios respectively, relative to
unit of fuel use. Higher energy prices reduce BASE. As described in Chapters 2 and 3,
final demand by about three percent relative these costs can be separated into several
to CAC (five percent relative to BASE). The categories: increased costs of energy
drop in primary coal demand is especially conversion and emission reduction; loss of
pronounced. producer surplus; costs imposed on final
Pattems of emissions differ in several energy demands in the household and
significant ways between ETAX2 and transport sectors; and losses of consumer
ETAXI. Recall that, in the latter case, only surplus from reduced final energy demands.
large stationary source emissions are taxed, All the costs in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are present
while final demand sources (households and values over 1990-2015, calculated at a real
transport) face direct controls. In ETAX2, discount rate of 12 percent.3 0
S02 and NO1 emissions from final users are Table 5.1 shows that, compared to
higher than in ETAXI or CAC; the fudi taxes BASE, the additional cost of enission control
have less effect on these emissions sources in GER is about 70 percent higher than under
than direct controls. As a consequence, any of the other sets of standards (CAC,
eniissions from energy conversion sources FRRED, or EEC), reflecting the sharp cuts in
must be lower to meet the overall targets. S0 2 and NO, emissions from stationary
Like ETAX I, ETAX2 has less bias against sources under GER. Given the interest in
new S02 sources than in CAC. For NO., on Poland in harmonizing with European
the other hand, it is cheaper in ETAX2 to Communiity standards, it is interesting that the
acconunodate higher end-use emissions by
sharply restricting emissions from new power
and from combined heat and power plants
than to restrict emissions from existing
stationary sources further.
The COALTX scenario is suninrized
in Tables A2.l0 and A2.1 1. Predictably, the
swingeing (100 percent) tax on coal households in 2000and 2010. The excise tax
significandy reduces its use relative to BASE assumed here doubles those prices.
and CAC: the final demand for solid fuels 3Obs discount rae is used to reflect thed .opect of
drops 21-29 percent arnd pfimary demand fo r real capital scarcity and nomrivial financial risks over
hardrops21-29by1724 percentand2primad de fext sevrral years. A lower discount ae wouldhard coal drops by 17-24 percent.2 ' cause a relative incrase io the present value of costs
for scenarios that involve higb capital investmncs in
"Table AlA indicates that Base Case hard coal later yeahs of the decisioo horizon, such as GER and
prices am $55-60/ton for industry and $93-98ton for ETAX2.
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Table 5.1. Social Cost of Pollution Control, 1991-2015 (CAC)
(US$ billions)Zi
SCENARIO
Cost component CAC FRRED EEC GER
Large point source control 6.57 6.73 6.56 15.43
costs and loss of producer
surplus _
Lost of consumer surplus 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Switch to gas by urban 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
households
Transport controls 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.89
Total 12.56 12.72 12.55 21.42
a/Discounted to 1990. 12% real discotint rate. Pollutants controlled are PM, S02, and NO,; see Chapter 4
for definitions of scenarios.
Table 5.2. Social Cost of Pollution Control, 1991-2015 (Economic Jnstruments)
(US$ billions)21
SCENARIO
Cost corn2onent ETAXI S02TR ETAX2 COALTX
Large point source control 5.30 5.87 5.51 9.76
costs and loss of producer
surplus
Loss of consumer surplus 0.02 0.02 0.22 1.04
Switch to gas in urban 0.08 0.08
households
Transport controls 5.89 5.89 .
Total 11.29 11.86 5.73 10.80
a/Discounted to 1 990. 12% real discount rate. Pollutants controlled are PM. S02, and NO.; see Chapter 4
for defiitions of scenarios.
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cost of meeting CAC is roughly the same as incentive-based policies. In pzarticular. the
EEC.3 1 model treats all potential tecitilologies and
Table 5.2 shows the costs of enission other strategies for entissions control as heing
control with taxes and (interplant) emnissions known in advance. In praclice. incentive-
trading relative to BASE.3 2 These figures can based policies will provi(le additional m-otives
be compared to the performance of CAC for developing new techlnologles and
(which allows for intraplant trading) in Table strategies. as noted in Chapter 2.
5.1. For policies applied to large sources Table A2.12 expands on the diifference'
(ETAXI and S021R), the cost savings over between stationary an(d tramsport controls 1v
CAC are fairly modest, partly because fairly comparing the unit control cost of littfer-"
expensive controls in the transport sector emission reduction strategies used in the
account for almost one-half of total emission transport sector under CAC. relative to other
control costs (relative to BASE) in all these options. While low-NO, diesel enigines
cases. When these controls are dropped and appear to be cost-effective methods for
economic incentives are applied to all emission reduction, catalytic cornveriers andi
pollutants, as in ETAX2, control costs are diesel oil desulphurization are very
more than halved relative to CAC.33 expensive. 14 It does not follow, however,
This comparison understates the that these transport controls should be
potential contribution of an incentive-based avoided. The unit costs of emission controls
approach since. as noted previously, our alone are not a sufficient basis for judgment.
version of CAC already assumes significant since the contribution of different sources to
flexibility for polluters in restricting emissions ambient air quality and the relative
from separate sources. Another important harmfulness of different pollutants also affect
source of understatement is that the model the social interest. Mobile sources contribute
ignores dynaric efficiency benefits from onmy a small percentage of total emissions. but
they could be disproportionately important in
We emphasize. however, that the environmental urban centers. Moreover. their inportance
consequences of the two sets of standards are not may grow over time (see Chapter Ix These
likely to be the same. In particular, West European issues are beyond the scope of the present
standards on S02 from large plants are tougher than study to address.
Polish standards, while the reverse is true for small A
plants. On the other hand, the EEC standards for PM Accordig to the model, ivestment
are much tighter than in CAC. outlays for the energy supply and conversion
3 2The total cost of the COALTX scenario also is system over 1991-2010 are substantial, even
reported in Table 5.13. The main point here is thrt without new environmental controls. In
there are considerable cosrs incurred for quite modest BASE, total undiscounted outlays are
emission reductions relative to BASE: the coal tax by US$65.7 billion over the period, with about
itself is a very cost-ineffective policy.
33As noted in Chapter4, we do not consider the 40 percent of these outlays (US$27.1 billion)
possibility that residential and transport users wouid occurring over 1991-2000. the period of
voluntarily switch to lower-emission technologies as a significant economic restructuring. The
consequence of the fuel taxes they face in ETAX2.
Such conversion will be efficient if the present value
of surplus losses from the higher taxes exceeds the 34The total cost figures in Table 5.2 indicate an even
opportunity cost of the new technology investment greater spread in cost-effectiveness: comparing
(including the cost of prematurely abandoning ETAXI and ETAX2. we find that the large cosi of
existing equipment). Thus our social cost figure for mandated controls can be avoided Nvith onlv a modest
ETAX2. which includes these surplus losses, may increase in stationary source controls along with a
overstate the cost of this scenario. modest decrease in consumer surplus.
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increases in total investnent oudays under The dramatic increases in taxes which
some of the environmental policies we are implied by ETAXI and ETAX2, and the
consider are shown in Table A2.13. As might resulting increases in final energy prices,
be expected, the stringency of environmental would spark social controversy.
standards in GER causes a substantial jump in Unfortunately, the lack of focus in the model
energy supply system investments (41 percent on individual sources makes a detailed
over BASE from 1991-2000 and 26 percent assessment of financial burden impossible.
over 1991-2010). The increases in CAC and However, some outputs of the model do help
ETAX2 are smaller, on the order of 7-9 to shed light on the issue.
percent (only 2 percent over 1991-2000 for One concrete indicator is that the tax
ETfAX2). increases in ETAXI and ETAX2 are
Differences in standards, control calculated by the model to generate additional
methods, and taxes across the scenarios also revenues with a present value of about US$9
generate variations in energy prices. To billion by 2015. This makes the total cost of
illustrate, Table 5.3 shows the increases in compliance (including increased fees) in
final energy prices relative to BASE for CAC, ETAXI about 55 percent higher than in
ETAX2, and COALTX. The effects of fixed CAC, even though the social cost of
emissions standards on final prices is abatement in ETAXI is lower (see Table
relatively modest (increases range from one 5.2). The compliance cost in ETAX2 is only
to seven percent)- The price increases in about 9 percent higher than in CAC.
ETAX2 are more substantial, particularly for reflecting the high degree of cost-
coal, reflecting the impacts of the emissions effectiveness achieved with comprehensive
charges. The COALTX scenario generates changes. In contrast, the distribution of
substantial increases in electricity and heat trading profits from large-source S02
prices, as well as coal, though these increases emission trading, with grandfathering, is
are eroded over time by substitution away shown in Table 5.5. While new sources face
from coal-fueled technologies. nontrivial costs of permit acquisition and
Table 5.4 summarizes the emissions fees some existing sources (especially existing
in ETAX I and ETAX2 and compares them to lignite plants) make substantial trading
Polish charges as of April 1, 1993. These profits, there is no net transfer of funds away
charges have risen sharply since 1990, but the from polluters and the total compliance costs
levels remain well below those required even appear to be much lower than under the tax
to attain interim (1995) standards and are an approaches. 35
order of magnitude too small for achieving The changed energy prices in all
emissions targets in 2010. Note particularly scenarios have important distributional effects
the need for large increases in PM charges. on households, but they are overwhelmingly
Ultimately PM and S02 fees are the same due to energy price refonns rather than
order of magnitude in ETAXI and ETAX2, environmental policies. In BASE, the share
whereas the current PM charge in Poland is of household expenditure allocated to fuel
only half the size of the current SO2 charge. and power increases between 1992 and 2000
As a matter of interest, the NO, tax of about
US$1 ,000/tonne in 2000 under ETAX2
translates into charges of about US$0.06/liter
on diesel fuel and US$0.03/liter on gasoline. 35Keep in mind that ETAXI and ETAX2 involve
dcarges on NOx and PM as well as S02, whereas
Table 5.5 descnbes expenses only for SO2 peTnits.
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Table 5.3. Energy Price Indices to Final Consumers for Scenarios
(Base = 1.0)
1995 2000 2010
Fuel/Scenario .
Industry Housing Industry Housing Industry Housing
Hard coal
ETAX2 1.17 1.13 1.29 1.23 1.35 1.28
COALTX 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Gasoline
CAC 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.03
ETAX2 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.06
Diesel oil
CAC 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04
ETAX2 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.20
Fuel oil (heavy)
CAC 1.00 . 1.02 . 1.04
ETAX2 1.07 . 1.34 . 1.35
Electicity
CAC 1.02 1.01 1.05 1.03 1.07 1.04
ETAX2 1.10 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.10 1.06
COALTX 1.20 1.14 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.06
District beat
CAC 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.02
ETAX2 1.09 1.06 1.08 1.05 1.08 1.02
COALTX 1.23 1.09 1.14 1.05 1.12 1.03
34
r'able 5.4. Pollution Fees (Actual) and Taxes for ETAXI and ETAX2
(US$/tonne)
1995 2000 2010
Pollutant 1990 1993
(end of yr) (April) _ .
ETAXI | ETAX2 ETAXI ETAX2 ETAX 1 ETAX2
So2 28 75 476 430 536 541 789 780
NOx 28 75 1029 542 1029 1029 1029 2716
PM 7 38 177 176 640 640 640 640
Table 5.5. Costs and Profits from Sulphur Dioxide Trading
S02 enmissions (thousand tonnes)
Trading Trading gains
category or losses
1990 2000
Initial S02TR
_endowment
Public power plants:
-new (hardcoal) 0.0 0.0 112.1 -60.5
-existing (hard coal) 671.2 511.3 540.1 -15.6
- existing (lignite) 691.8 527.0 344.7 +98.5
Public CHP plants:
- new 0.0 0.0 64.1 -34.6
- existing 259.7 197.8 193.9 +2.1
Industial power plants:
- new 0.0 0.0 15.6 -8.4
- existing 344.7 262.6 230.3 +17.4
Industrial heating plants:
- existing 229.3 174.7 143.3 +17.0
Municipal heating plants:
- existing 97.4 74.2 103.4 -15.8
Total 2315.6 1747.6 1747.6 0.0
Note: Equilibrium permit price = US$ 540/tonne of SO 2
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by 95 percent for urban salary and wage- 2010 under CAC, EEC, ETAXI and S02TR.
earning households, 75 percent for rural However, the main impact on coal production
households, and 80 percent for retired comes from general economic restructuring
individuals. After 2000 the expenditure share and energy price refonns. Coal use dropped
impacts decline steadily. In comparison to sharply between 1988 and 1990, and while it
these increases, the increases from all the recovers somewhat in the BASE case, it does
environmental policies are calculated to be not return to the 1988 level even by 2010.
nugatory (at most an additional percentage Several of the policy scenarios further depress
point for rural households and retired persons coal production, but generally only by modest
in the case of the large coal tax). amounts (the maximum being four percent in
The impacts of different emission 1995 in FRRED). The major reason for this
reduction strategies on the coal industry merit is that the shortfall in domestic coal and
special attention, given its political and social lignite demand is largely offset by expons of
significance. As seen in Table A2.14, there is hard coal. Hence, even a 100 percenT coal
some reduction in coal production with all the tax, which generates revenues of US$2.8-3.6
policies relative to BASE in 1995, although bilion per annum from 1995, causes coal
the BASE production level is achieved by production to fall by only about 2 percent.
Chapter 6
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The simulation results in Chapter 5 suggest INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND-7
that there are potential savings worth
pursuing in using incentive-based control The February 1990 Ordinance sets ambient
policies. This finding echoes much of the air quality standards which, as already noted,
previous work on environmental policy are generally tighter than in the West. Energy
design in the US and other advanced combustion sources, with installations
countries, where the potential savings appear exceeding 200 kW, face emission standards
to be even larger, given the inefficiencies as well (see Chapter 4). Both ambient and
engendered by rigid technology-based emission standards are set nationally and
standards.3 6 Nevertheless, the actual cannot be strengthened by local authorities,
advantages of incentive-based policies may except by declaring a whole region to be a
fall considerably short of the theoretical ideal, "specially protected" area a costly option
because of technical problems in structuring for the locality.
such policies, and compromises struck to The State Inspectorate for
address political concems. Environmental PRotection-an autonomous
In Chapter 6, we explore this set of unit reporting directly to the Environment
institutional issues to see how they condition Minister-has the task of monitoring both
recommendations for air pollution policy in discharges and ambient conditions. Most of
Poland. We first briefly describe the existing the work is done by Inspectorate officers and
statutory, institutional, and monitorng laboratories at the voivodship (provincial)
apparatus in Poland. We then lay out a set of level. Under the 1990 Ordinance, high
general criteria for evaluating policy designs emitters (more than 1200 kg S more than
-CAC, charges, and emissions trading. 800 kg dust) must continuously monitor their
Using these criteria, we contrast the own emissions. Some monitoring also is
perfonnance of these three strategies. done by the state Sanitary Engineering
Bureau, which helps maintain monitoring
sites.
Monitoring occurs at three spatial
levels. First, a state system tracks broad
_____________________ trends in S0 2 , NOx and PM based on results
36Asurvey by Tietenberg (1990) reveals thatigid from about 70 sites throughout Poland, paid
policies for air poUution control wexe likely to cost 2- for by the state budget. Second, voivodship
20 times as much as ideal least-cost control measures. monitoring often is done in cooperation with
Even with less than ideal incentive-based policies, heavy polluters mentioned above. Third, at
estimated cost savings are impressive (Hahn and the local level, some factories monitor toxics
Hester 1989). Note that most of these studies have and metals discharges on instruction from the
been concerned with meeting ambient standards
rather than the emissions standards of concern here. VoWodsh).
With ambient standards, total abatement cost can be
reduced futher by allowing relatively larger 37Tbe material in this section is based in part on
emissions in locations wbere the standards are not interviews with members of the Ministry of
binding. By construction. these savings are ruled out Environment and the State Inspectorale for
in our study Environmental Protection.
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Compliance responsibilities and efforts Table 5.4 compares the emission taxes
are divided between voivodship offices of the needed to anain projected future emission
State Inspectorate, which monitor to check standards with the actual structure of Polish
compliance and compute pollution charges, fees. The sharp increase in fees between
and the voivodship offices of water and 1990 and 1993 is widely believed to have
environmental management, which issue stimulated emission reductions, but the
permits and colect fees and fines. Peniits amount of emission reduction due to the fee
specify discharge levels (the maximum increases versus general economic
permitted, and the average and annual restructuring remains unclear (exceptions to
discharges pernitted) and the use of fines and standards in enforcement contribute
particular abatement measures (e.g., chinmey to this identification problem). Current fees
height and diameter) whose installation is apparently are too low to bring total
monitored by the Inspectorate. The pemnits emissions to levels envisaged in the 1990
are based on air dispersion modeling of the Ordinance, however. Recent legal actions
impact of emissions on air quality, carried out also call into question the legality of
by private companies, which must follow regionally differentiated fees (as opposed to
strict guidelines. If the estimated pollutants standards) in order to encourage the greatest
at specified locations, as calculated by the abatement in areas of high damage (Zylicz
model. exceed the regulations, action will be 1992).
required before a permit is issued to the Apparently the Ordinance currently is
emitter (e.g., raising the chimney height). being interpreted to allow an emission-control
Polluters can argue for higher emission limits "bubble" over a whole plant (groups of
by recalculating projectcd ambient effects. stacks).3 5 However, emissions trading among
Fees for "regular" emission levels within plants is not permitted under the present law,
the penrnit are codified in the current even at a very local level. New air pollution
ordinance and adjusted for inflation. Fines legislation currently under consideration may
are based on a half-hour "violation episode" provide some encouragement for local
and are paid based on amount of measured trading. More interregional trades among
exceedance and tirne ($/kg/hr) until the large sources alo are conceivable. provided
polluter can prove compliance has been local ambient standards are not breached.
reestablished. Flagrant violation-such as
clearly not having functional abatement THE EFFECT OF RESTRUCTURING
equipment-can lead to partial or total plant ON ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
closure and niisdemeanor criminal
proceedings against the operator, but this is Important changes in economic policy.
rarely done. Some level of informal which started to take place in Poland after
regulation also occurs, based on negotiation 1988, are expected to transform the way in
e.g-, permits are issued and fines are which polluters respond to economic
calculated at the same time where meeting the incentives. In the past, a central plannimg
standards clearly is impossible. In some approach to resource allocation, relying
cases, however, the emissions are too high to extensively on physical planning targets
issue a permit and the regulator sinply has no combined with soft-budget constraints.
leverage over the plant, which keeps seriously undermined environmental
operating.
38PemsonaI communication, Professor Tomasz Zvlicz.
9 March 1993.
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policy.3 9 As argued by Zylicz (1993), measures designed to facilitate the
"financial instruments were doomed to restructuring of enterprises, using the state-
failure in an economy where all essential owned commercial banks as key agents of
inputs were allocated administratively, and change. Given the fundamental role to be
plant managers had little incentive to pay assumed by the banks, the EBRP also aims at
attention to price stimuli." However, recent stimulating their efficiency, including
reforms in the enterprise and banking sectors (ultimately) privatization. A crucial outcome
are resulting in a hardening of budget of the EBRP will be further movement from
constraints and an improvement in resot -ce soft to hard budgets, in both the enterprise
utilization. Furthermore, the privatization of and banking sectors.
large segments of the Polish economy is Despite these changes, it is obvious
introducing more effective property rights, a that SOEs will continue to be major players
pre-condition for medium- to long-term in the Polish economy, at least in the
productivity gains. medium term. In that context, there is
An early attemnpt at restructuring the encouraging evidencc that Firms are
Polish economy was taken with the Law on becoming more cost conscious. A recent
Joint Ventures, in December 1988. The Law survey of 75 large state-owned manu-
had some limited success, and a number of facturing enterprises (Pinto, Belka and
joint ventures were forned in the following Krajewski 1993; Hume and Pinto 1993)
two years, but the Govemnment of Poland shows that, even without privatization, SOEs
took a major first step toward full-fledged are adjusting, restructuring and increasing
privatization in 1990, when it initiated an profitability in response to the ETP. Of
Economic Transformation Program (ETP). particular relevance is the finding that, "all
The ETP led to the rapid privatization of firms managed to reduce the consumption of
many small enterprises, although the pace materials and energy per unit of sales"
was slower than initially expected for the (Hume and Pinto 1993, p. 19). Specifically,
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Kharas the 31 best companies reduced energy and
1991). Problems have been caused by the material consumption by 22 percent between
recession, which followed the introduction of 1991-92, and the remaining ones by
the ETP, and by the simultaneous collapse of approximately 17 percent (Hume and Pinto
trading arrangements linked to the Council of 1993).
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). While these profound changes in
Furthermore, the process of privatization economic policy are already in train, and
proved to be much more complex and beneficial results are discemible, the timing
lengthy than initially expected. In light of and speed of further change are matters of
these and other factors, the Government has considerable uncertainty in Poland, as in the
developed an Enterprise and Bank other economies in transition. The effects of
Restructuring Program (EBRP). The EBRP decades of central planning will take years to
will simultaneously address the inter-related attenuate. Nevertheless, the progress to date
problems of the SOEs, which are not gives grounds for optimism that, in the
servicing their debts, and of the conunercial period 1995-2000, restructuring and energy
banks. The EBRP contains additional pricing reform will have proceeded far
enough to justify the assumptions underlying
the scenarios and simulation results discussed
39 A discussion of the effect of soft budgets in a in Chaptcrs 4 and 5. From the standpoint of
central planning regime can be found in Komai actually dcsigning environmental policics,
(1992).
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the reforms make it realistic to seriously Finally, an evaluation of environmental
consider incenltive-based measures. policies in an open economy like Poland's
must consider the consistency between
CO)NSIDERATI()NS FOR POLICY overall nationial interests and the policies of
EVA,lATIOl()N other countries. Different environmental
policies will have different effects on relative
Economic elficiency is the criterion most prodiuct prices and the terms of trade. These
commllonly invoked in comparisons of CAC effects will depend in part on ihe policies
witlh incentive-based policies. There are, pursued by other countries. With these points
however, other important criteria as well. in mind, wc now consider CAC. pollution
The following points are grouped into two charges, and tradeable permit policies in turn.
broad categories: those related tn legal and
teclnical features, and tlhose relate. to equity Command and Control
and other political economy concems (see
also Tripp and Dudek 1989). There is a legal basis for the current system of
Regarding legal and technical features, air emission and ambient standards for
prospects for success with environmental stationary sources, though there is some
policies are enhanced if there is a cdear legal doubt about the consistency of the two
authority for taking action; the goals of policy standards. Further legislation would be
are clearly stated; the effects of policy are needed to pursue measures such as fuel
consistent with those goals; there is adequate restrictions on households (e.g., an urban coal
capacity for monitoring effects of the policy use ban) or new controls in the transport
measures; and the regulatory authorities sector (e.g., catalytic converters). As
possess both the technical capacity to described above, monitoring capacity is in
intexpret the evidence and the capacity to place and improving. The technical capacity
enforce compliance. Regarding the political of the regulatory authorities also is growing.
economy issues, environmental policy is more The legal system is theoretically capable of
likely to succeed if the overall opportunity enforcing standards, but such enforcement in
cost to society is kept as small as possible practice is often weak, partly because of
(given the environmental objectives); and the unwillingness to deal with the social
pc -y does nor create a large constituency of consequences of shutting down emnission
oi sition because of adverse distributional sources and causing significant economic
cf -s or other factors that make private dislocations.
con iance costs high. A successful outcome Poland also is likc many countries in
is albo more likely if there is greater flexibility that its environmental goals, and their
for individual actors in the means of relationship to current CAC policies, are not
compliance, across sources and regions; and entirely clear. The emission standards are
procedural obstacles that give rise to high meant to contribute to the achievemnent of
**transaction costs" for compliance are limited. ambient targets, but the latter usually take
Other irnportant factors, particularly for a priority.40 It is conceivable that under the
transitional economy like Poland, are
robustness in the face of imperfect, evolving 40MP mg 4A tager question beyond our scope coDcers th
market institutions and incentives for cost- ambient standards themselves. These standards
reducing innovations in products and should be set to reflect estimated or suspected
processes. damages to human health, investment capital, historic
anifacts, and natural systems. However, the absolute
40
emission standards, some sources would have policies mnay have greater effects on product
to overcontrol rclative to the abatement prices and terns of trade than CAC, even
necessary to meet ambient standards; or though the incentive-based policies are morc
sources could face control requirements in cost-effective. ln this situation, unilateral
excess of the emission standards to meet adoption of incentive-based policies in Poland
arnbient limists. A technical difficulty arises could create competitive disadvantages vis-a-
here in defining the level of "background" vis other trading partners that would be
ermissions used to calculate a source's impact vexing tor Poland's struggling economy.4'
on ambient conditions. It is not clear that
these "background" emnissions are properly Emission Fees
measured (to exclude the impact of the
source itself); but in any case, in a situation The legal basis for emission fees in Poland is
where ambient standards are already violated, well established. Fees are levied directly on
it is accepted that a source will stiLl be monitored sources and indirectly on motor
permitted to operate, provided its excess fuels (Zylicz 1993). This point is important,
emissions are less than 20 percent of the since the use of energy taxcs based on relative
standard on a 30-minute basis. pollution content may be a uscful practical
Although the social cost of CAC is strategy where direct monitoring and
higher than more cost-effective outcomes, as charging for emissions is problematic. The
noted previously, the effect is somewhat existing system for monitoring compliance
muted by the fact the Polish CAC is less rigid with standards also allows fees to be
than purely t*echnology-based standards; estimated. Enforcemcnt v-f the fees has been
Polish sources have more choice in abatement more problematic, particularly recently, when
options, and some intraplant emission trading there were substantial dislocations in the
among sources appears to be feasible. The economy and fees rose sharply. Success in
current system leaves relatively undisturbed using higher fees as an enforcement tool wil
the set of status quo interests in use of the be limited if there are frequent waivers or
environment as waste sink (e.g., more subsidies from public budgets. However, this
stringent controls are imposed on new problem is not unique to emission fees; weak
sources), so there is no automatic environmental enforcement also undercuts
constituency among polluters in favor of CAC.
change. In fact, as noted above, the prinary The distinction between pollution
constituency is in favor of weakening charges as revenue-raisers and fees as
standards where short-term adjustment costs enforcement tools needs to be emphasized.
are high. The CAC approach also is In Poland, as in many West European
compatible with existing policies in the countries, fees contribute to government
countries of the EC, notwithstanding revenue that can be used for meeting urgent
acknowledgment by those countries that social needs in the cleanup of extant
incentive-based policies can be more cost- environmental damage (thereby strengthening
effective than CAC methods for air pollution incentives for actually collecting the fees).
control. As discussed below, incentive-based This purpose is fundamentally different from
the use of emission fees as enforcement tools,
and relative magnitudes of these changes, both locally
and nationally, remain controversial; and as noted 4tEven for nontraded goods like electricity and
previously. Polish standards are very tight compared diztrict beat, indirect trade effeas through prices of
to Westem nonns other commodities could be significant.
41
where the charge rates are higher and the goal whilc assuring environmental conditions, is to
of policy is to shrink the "revenue base." weaken the cost-effectiveness of the fee
Raising revenue for ameliorating past approach.4 2
environmental neglect also differs Stiff fees also create an automatic
substantially from the use of fee receipts for constituency against their use by charging
subsidizing new pollution control efforts. polluters for all ernissions, not just emissions
While there is understandably a constituency in excess of the standards. In this situation,
for the latter application of fee proceeds, such private compliance costs may exceed the
efforts risk continuing or aggravating CAC level for many polluters, even if social
problemns of economic restructuring (i.e.. the compliance costs (net of tax) are reduced-43
need to move toward hard budgets), and they The problem is magnified when trading
can undercut the incentives for cost- parmers use CAC and their product prices
minimization that make emission charges thus do not include the charges on residual
more cost-effective than CAC. emissions. In this case emission fees can
Emission fees not only can promote create domestic opposition based on trade
flexibility in compliancc strategies but also disadvantages, since the fees raise the relative
can induce innovation in pollution reduction, cost of domestic exports to foreign buyers.44
since even sources in compliance wil have an Finally, it should be noted that, in order
incentive to reduce their tax liability. Fees to meet ambient standards as wel as source
also can be applied even in noncompetitive emission standards in a cost-effective way,
markets, an important consideration in fees have to be differentiated across sources
Poland's transitional economy. When finns and regions to reflect the differing
can exercise market power, the cost- contributions of sources to ambient
effectiveness of a pollution tax must be conditions and the divergence among regions
balanced against the impact of a tax in further in excess emissions. Clearly, setting uniforTn
restricting output below competitive levels. fees high enough to meet the most stringent
However, a more complicated problem arises ambient standard in the most polluted region
when finns have weak incentives to minimize would involve significant overcontrol
costs (Oates and Strassmann 1984). In the elsewhere. At a minimum, some "zoning" of
Polish context, this can arise because of direct fees locaUy and regionally is needed to
subsidies, soft finance windows for control contribute to effective attainment of ambient
investments, or direct government standards. However, differential fees are
intervention in enterprise operation. Again, currently not admissible, as noted above.
however, these conditions also will harnper
CAC.
There are several aspects of fees that
arguc against their use as a primary
enforcement tool. Their use requires the 42wbile fees cannot assure emissions, they do put an
capacity to index against inflation and to raise upper bound on the marginal abatement costs firms
fees as economic growth engenders pollution will underlake. This is a useful escape valve against
increases. Because fees do not provide the excessive abatement expenditures.
assurance of standard inlimitl 43Chapter 5 reports the aggregate financial burden in
our two tax scenarios. ETAXI and ETAX2.
emissions, it is doubtful in practice whether "See Burtraw (1993) for further discussion
fees would ever replace standards. However, Convesely. attempts to maintain emission fees below
the effect of a binding pollution standard, levels in some Westem European countries could
become a bone of contention with trading partners
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Emission Trading Depending on the structure of the program,
such trades can hold toial emissions constant
The legal status of emission trading is the or require a net reduction of emissions to
least clear of the strategies we are improve air quality. Intemal or extemal
considering. As noted above, air pollution trades also can occur over time, as unused
legislation currently under consideration is emission pennits are accumulated and
understood to include a clarification of how subsequently used, a process known as
individual polluting entities might trade off "banking."
controls on their own contiguous sources Difficulties in organizing emission
(e.g., controls on multiple sources within the trading arise in connection with the specificity
same power or steel plant). The scope for and security of property rights over emission
trading among nearby sources might also be allowances, and with "transaction costs," the
increased. However, regional-scalc trading, general ease or difficulty of effectua:ing
as in the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act transactions. Property rights issues arise. for
Amendments authorizing S0 2 trading, seems example, when there is ambiguity in the
to be a more distant prospect. definition or measurement of baseline
Eniission trading also will put some emissions against which "excess" control
additional operational and monitoring burdens available for sale is reckoned, and when there
on regulators. The extent of thcse burdens is amnbiguity about the status of banked
depends on the scale of trading. For a full- emission credits. Insecuity about property
blown permit market with many participants, rights limit supply and demand for permits
a formal exchange system must evolve and and thus the volume of transactions. High
continuous monitoring may be needed to transaction costs that also limit trading can
ensure the integrity of trades. For more arise from onerous approval procedures for
informal "swaps" of control responsibility trades or requirements that transactions
among individual polluters the regulatory reduce net emissions (a form of transactions
burden will not be as large, though it is stil tax).
necessary to ensure that violation of the In addition to reducing overall trading,
standard by one polluter is matched by such obstacles bias emission transactions in
ovcrcontrol on the part of another pollutcr. favor of intemal trading, where difficulties in
To better understand the prospects for identifying transaction partners, securing
success with emission trading in Poland, it is property rights, and completing trades are
important to keep in mind that the textbook smaller. As a consequence, some cost-
model of an organized, competitive permit effective extemal trades are nmissed.46 This
market is one end of a continuum. At the
other end is intraplant trading across sources Qffs can involve intemal and exteral
amount. Oiescnivleitmladecea
by a firn (or other entity), and in between are trades. Bubbles are aggregations of pollution from all
infonnal bilateral trades of various types.45 sources in a particular plant or area that require
control only on the aggregates. rather than on
45Emission trading under the U.S. Clean Air Act has individual source emissions. Bubbles also can
included "netting," "offsets," and 'bubbles." Netting involve intemal or extemal trades: of the three
allows a firm creating a new discharge source to options listed here, they come closest to the textbook
avoid stringent new source performance standards if description of emission trading. For further
it reduces emissions from other plant sources. discussion see Hahn and Hester (1Q89) and
Netting is always an internal trade. Offsets allow Tietenberg (1985. 1990).
new sources to enter "non-attainment areas" if they 46rbe survey by Hahn and Hester (1989) documents
reduce existing source emissions by an even greater the predominance of intemal trades in the U.S. Clean
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point has been emphasized by Atkinson and 1984). However, research to date suggests
Tietenberg (1991), who argue that bubble that even fairly "thin" permit markets could
transactions in the US emissions trading be relatively efficient, and that significant
program have been bilateral and sequential, market power over permits is relatively
rather than the multilateral simultaneous unlikely if permits initially are widely
exchanges needed to arrive at an efficient distributed based on historical emissions
outcome. However, a significant part of this (Tietenberg 1990).
trading inefficiency may stem from regulatory A bigger issue is regulation of
policies that hinder the actions of self- production and pricing decisions by private or
interested parties in developing better state-owned finfns that leads such firms away
informational and trading institutions with from socially cost-mininiizing decisions.
lower transaction costs. Regulatory distortions will occur, for
Concems over both property rights and example, if firms face favorable regulatory or
transaction costs stem in part from conflicts tax treatrnent of compliance expenditures
between environmental objectives (improved relative to expenditures on emission
air quality) and holding down compliance allowances. This is an especially serious
cost burdens. T'his tension is manifested in, problem in regulating emissions from the
for example, wrangling over emission electric power sector, where goverrnent
baselines and regulatory checks on trades. intervention is likely to remain ubiquitous
Such conflict is particularly important to keep cven after economic restructuring.48
in mind in considering the Polish situation. Another important institutional
where there are strong desires both to hold difficulty in establishing emission trading (and
down compliance costs and to improve air charge systems) relates to the nature of
quality.4 7 different pollutants in the atmosphere. The
Emission trading also may fail to ultimate goal of pollutant control is improving
achieve its theoretical potential because of ambient air quality. When pollutants miL
distortions caused by market power over relatively unifonnly over medium to large
emission allowances or by regulation of firms' areas, the location of individual emissions is
product output and pricing decisions (as in not that important in determining overall air
the public utility sector). A firm with market quality. Emission permits supplied and
power over permits could distort the demanded by dispersed polluters can be
allocation of permits among other existing treated as interchangeable. Policy in these
polluters and encumber entry of efficient cases can focus directly on emission control.
competitors in its product markets (Hahn In contrast, when pollutants do not mix
unifonrly, the location of emissions does
Air Act program and provides several explanations matter in detemining the effect of emission
based on propeny rights and transactioncost reductions on air quality. In this case,
concemns. Tietenberg (1990) cites evidence that multiple permit systems generally are needed
potential cost savings under emissions trading may be to filily reflect the impacts of parficular
significant even wit intemal trading alone, but there emissions at different receptor points. Such
nonetheless appeals to be a substantial loss of cost- systems are fairly difficult to structr and
effectiveness from constraints on extemal trading, costy to imlement. Compromises, such as
47See also Oates, Pornty and McOartland (1989) stly sources into Comprones, often
who argue that some nominal overcool under CAC stratiyig sourcs into trading zones, ofen
may not be a social burden because aggregate
pollution reduction below prevailing standards is "Sce Bobi and Burtiaw (1992) for discussion of this
justified in light of the danages caused- issue in the U.S. contexL
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can significantly linit cost-effectiveness by the important point is that they can exploit
restricting trading options (see Tietenberg some gains. Many of the obstacles to c.ading
1985, Clhapter 4 and Tietenberg 1990 for in past US experience appear to have beea
further discussion). In practice, trading with regulatorv rather than intrinsic and thus could
non-unifornly mnixed pollutants generally be avoided by regulators in Poland.50
involves mostly contiguous sources in order The argument for at least limited trading
to lessen these challenges. An irnportant is supported by experience from the attempt
exception to this pont arises when the target to institute trading on an experimental basis in
volume of aggregate emission reductions is Chorzow, a city in Upper Silesia (Dudek,
very large, as in the US S02 program. In this Kulczynski, and Zylicz 1992). In Chorzow,
case, it is more likely that ambient conditions significant pollution is caused by both a steel
generally will improve even if emissions are mill and a power plant. The stecl plant
reallocated through trading, and the locations already has undertaken some modemization
of specific polluters may be less important. that reduces emissions (closing coke ovens
Like ermissions taxes, emissions trading and piping in natural gas). Further
wil stimulate innovation in pollution contremplated changes (closing of open hearth
reduction. However, this stimulus will be furnaces) would yield additional pollution
attenuated if trading options are lirmited. The reduction. The power plant is far out of
domestic constituency against emission compliance and is considering ambitious but
trading is likely to be weaker than with taxes expensive modernization (installation of
because the initial endowment of emission fluidized bed boilers) to meet stricter
rights could be adjusted to address standards likely to be faced in 1997.
distributional concerns Nevertheless, Accelerating the power plant moderniization
emission trading could have intemational would be cosdy, while reducing its output or
trade effects if a sector that is imponant in closing the plant would have serious social
trade- for example, a growing sector with consequences.
few grandfathered emission rights-also must Under these circumstances, significant
incur significant costs for permit acquisition.4 9 cost savmgs and more rapid environmental
Balanced against this effect, on the other improvement were estinated to be attainable
hand, is the very real possibility of cost if the power generator financed further
savings because of the flexibility embodied in abatement at the steclworks. However,
emissions trading. proceeding with this plan requires regulators
It is important to note again that many to approve continued operation of the power
of the difficulties with emission trading- plant with emission levels in excess of its
monitoring, verifying trades, guarding against standard, in a region that already faces
market power, reconciling emission controls serious pollution loadings. Apparently this
with ambient air conditions-are mnst serious transaction so far has been blocked by lack of
for full-blown permit trading on a wide scale regulatory approval.
and may be less serious in more limited
transactions. Such transactions are less 5sEoissions trading may actually improve
effective in exploiting all gains from trade, but envirornental compliance in that some highly
polluting finns that might otherwise either close
down or emit with impunity, given uneveo
491Te same may be true even for sectois w.t- large enforcement of CAC, can finance abatement
pennit endowments if the opportunity cost of investments under emissions trading with sales of
foregone permit sales is rolled into product prices. emission reduction cedits that they generate.
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The discussion m di chapter has instruments as mutually exclusive. All three
focused on comparing CAC, emnission fees, approaches to pollution control have a role to
and emission trading. However, it is play. In the next chapter we oudine an
important not to see the choice of policy integrated strategy.
Chapter 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The following seem to be among the key trivial. They arise in pan from relaxing new-
points implied by the simulation analysis: source bias in command approaches.
Previous research suggests also that
(1) Significant decreases in air pollution significant savings are possible just from
enmissions are likely from economic intraplant emission trading, for which the
restructuring and energy pricing refonns, model already allows, even in conmmand-and-
even without major new environmental control cases.
initiatives. Nevertheless, tighter (enforced)
emission standards such as those envisaged (4) Further savings may be possible by
under current Polish policy may generate extending incentive-based policies to more
considerable additional decreases in pollution, decentralized emissions sources in lieu of
particularly PM and S02. costly commnand and control (as in the
transport sector in our study). However,
(2) The Polish legal standards differ in these savings in the scenarios derive partly
important respects from typical West from eliminating relatively costly pollution
European standards; in particular, Polish PM control measures (like catalytic converters in
standards are looser, while Polish NOx our cases) that might not be imposed anyway
standards are tighter. However, the costs of in a more cost-conscious command-and-
meeting the two altemative sets of standards control policy regime. The comparison of a
in Poland do not appear to be widely very costly command-and-control scheme to
different. Thus, cost would not appear to be an ideal set of incentive-based policies
a major obstacle in switching to standards probably overstates the benefits of broadening
more dosely attuned to the European the scope for the latter policies.
Community; the larger questions are the
capability of meeting any standards as tough (5) As the experiment with a coal tax
as the Polish or EC standards and the suggests, pollution control policies and
willingness to alter emphases on pollutants. incentives need to be broad-based to make
While the Polish and typical EC effective headway in reducing emissions at
standards involve roughly comparable costs, reasonable costs. Focusing on orly a few
the costs of the strict German standards are sources or fuels is likely to have disappointing
significantly higher. The size of this extra and expensive results.
cost underscores a need for corresponding
benefit assessment to detenmine the value to (6) Both command and incentive-based
Poland of such standards. policies will require considerable expenditures
to achieve the specified standards. However,
(3) There are clear cost savings from using the impacts on investment and energy prices
incentive-based policy instruments, even of environmental policies is likely to be
though the exact size of the savings cannot be dwarfed by the forces of economic
precisely identified. Even with limited restructuring and energy price reform that
application of taxes or pennit trading to large have already been unleashed and that are a
e?ationazy sources, cost savings are not
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prerequisite for ultimate success in However, for the reasons noted previously it
environmental policy. is unlikely that fees will rise to the level
necessary to meet current emissions
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS standards. To accomplish this goal cost-
effectively, an evolutionary movement toward
The argument in Chapter 6, coupled with the emissions trading among large stationary
simulation results, suggests a dynamic and sources is needed.5' Trading could start with
mixed strategy for the choice of economic informal bilateral transactions, as in the US,
instruments. If necessary, CAC alone might and become more extensive as circumstances
be relied upon, particularly for household and and the interests of polluters warrant.5 2 To
transport sources, where emission trading is accomplish his requires in turn a clearer legal
costly to arrange and taxes are technically or and regulatory authority for emnission trading,
politically difficult to apply. For larger as well as continued progress in econonic
sources, however, and even for smaller restructring so that firms have incentives to
sources where feasible, increased reliance seek out lower-cost abatement options.
would be placed on economic instuments. We emphasize again the inportance of
These instruments would complement CAC continued progress in economic and energy
standards rather than substituting for them. price reform as both a complement to and a
In particular, the standards would provide a prerequisite for success in environmental
basis for computing emission fees and for policy. In particular, it is likely to be the case
structuring emission trades. that greater reliance on incentive-based
A starting point for the approach we policies will require fiuther maturation of the
envisage is raising emission fees above economic system in Poland-continued
current levels. This would encourage some reduction of direct and indirect subsidies, and
additional abatement and technical in direct enterprise decisionmaking by
innovation, as well as providing added govemment. Without such progress,
revenues for cleanup of existing effective enforcernent of conunand-based
environmental damages (or other purposes). approaches also will face serious roadblocks.
5tNote that when fees and pennits a uwed in
tandem, an increase in the former lowers the value of
the latter aud causes permit prices to fail an equal
amount.
52Thew may also be scope for trading between point
and nonpoint sources, as is carrensly being attanpted
expeimentally in the US (e.g., th redrement of old
vehides in California).
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Table Al.l. Economic Growth and Structural Change to 2010
(1990 prices)
Category 1988 199G 1995 2000 2010
Population (millions) r .9 38.2 38.8 39.5 41.0
Gross National Product (GNP)
-Trillions of zloty 685 607 634 798 1181
- Index (1990=100) 113 100 105 132 195
Contribution to GNP (%)
- Energy industry 6.1 6.9 7.7 7.2 5.6
- Total industry (incL. energy) 52.2 46.1 44.7 42.8 39.7
- Construction 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.2 7.0
- Agriculture 6.1 7.1 6.8 5.8 4.9
-Transport 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.2
-Other 29.0 34.2 35.8 39.2 44.2
Table A1l2. Production of Energy-Intensive Products and Services
Product/service 1988 1990 1995 2000 2010
Pig iron (103 tonnes) 10260 8400 7850 7800 7650
Steel (103 tonnes) 16870 13450 11200 12550 12400
Copper (103 tonnes) 401 346 375 390 450
Aluminum (103 tonnes) 48 47 48 49 50
Sulphur (103 tonnes) 5000 4696 4900 4900 5070
Ammonia (103 tonnes) 2340 1580 2150 2500 2600
Cement (103 tonm.s) 17000 12500 13600 15020 16000
Freight transp. (109 tnme-lan)n L 144 97 107 125 164
DwelUings (103)
- newbt 0 0 650 1400 4600
- retrofittedb/ 0 0 880 2200 6050
-Total 10925 11180 11730 12360 15310
Private cars (106) 4.5 5.3 6.0 6.8 8.8
A only professional land transport included
b/since 1990
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Table A13. International Fuel Pricesa/
(USS/unit)
Fuel Unit 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Hard Coal -tc-
- lump size (export price) 51 53 57 59 62
- coal fines (export price) 47 48 52 55 58
- coking coal (export price) 53 53 56 59 62
- coal fines 52 54 57 60 62
Natural Gas 103m3
-pipeline (traditional) 100 113 125 131 138
- pipeline (new) 110 124 137 144 152
-LNG 144 159 175 185 195
Liquid fuels ton _
- crude oil (heavy) 140 '60 180 199 218
- gasoline 240 274 308 343 377
- diesel 193 221 248 275 302
- heavy fuel oil 96 108 119 129 138
Nuclear fuel tceV 24 25 27 27 28
AIAI import prices are cif for imports except those noted as "export price," which are fob.
/bltonne of coal equivalent
Table. A1.4. Fuel Prices to Final Energy Consumers in BASE Case
(US$Sunit)
Fuel Unit June '92 1995 2000 2010
Hard coal
- to industry tce 43 52 55 60
- to households tce 76 88 93 98
Natural gas
- to industry 103 m3 130 132 144 158
- to households 103m3 160 280 300 310
Gasoline tonme 654 1033 1158 1419
Diesel oil tonne 395 514 572 703
Fuel oil light tome - 310 347 425
Electricity
- to industry MWh 41 51 52 53
- to households MWh 42 81 81 82
District heat
- to industry GJ 3.6 4.7 4.9 5.2
- to households GJ 4.2 8.4 8.7 8.9
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Table ALS. Sharc of TransmissiontDistribution Costs and Taxes in Fuel Prices
to Final Consumers In 1995, the BASE Case
Fuel Share
Hard coal
- to industry 20
- to households 40
Natural gas
- to industry 10
- to households 60
Gasoline 75
Diesel oil 60
Fuel oil light 35
Electrcity
- to industry 30
- to households 55
District heat
- to industry 10
- to households 50
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Table A1.6. Own Price Elasticities Applied in the Scenariosl/
Fueltsector Industry Transport-/ Residentiall
._________ .Commerdal
Solid fuels -0.5 0 -0.4
Fuel oil -1.0 0 -0.4
Motor fuels -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Gas -0.5 0 -0.4
Electricity -0.5 0 -0.5
Heat -0.5 0 -0.4
/lIn the transport sector, it has been assumed that only demand for motor fuels (gasoline and diesel oil) is
price elastic. Little hard coal is consumed in this sector; and while electricity is used by railways, electricity
costs are a small proportion of total costs. so it has been assumed that no denand adjustment will occur as a
result of higher electricity prices due to stricter environmental regulations.
Table A1.7. Polish SO2 Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source A B C
Coal:
- fixed grate 990 720 650
-mechanical grate 990 640 200
-PF- dy bottom4/ 1240 870 200
-PF- wet bottom 1240 870 200
Lignite:
PF - dry bottom 1540 1070 200
-PF - wet bottom 1540 1070 200
Coke:
-fixed grate 410 410 410
- mechanical grate 500 250 250
Fuel Oil:
-< 5O MWth 1720 1250 1250
->50MWth 1720 170 170
2PF- pulverized fuel
A = interim standards for existing (pre-1994) sources
B = final standards for existing sources
C = standards for new (post-1994) sources
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Table A1.8. Polish NOX Standards
(g$GJ fuel input)
Source A B C
Coal:
- fixed grate 35 35 35
- mechanical grate 160 95 95
-PF- dry botom 330 170 170
PF - wet bottom 495 170 170
Lignite:
- PF- dry bottom 225 150 150
- PF - wet bottom 225 150 150
Coke,
- fixed grate 45 45 45
- mechanical grate 145 145 110
Fuel Oil:
-< 50 MWth 120 120 90
- > 50 MWth 160 160 120
Natural Gas:
- S< MWth 60 35 35
- > S0 MWth 145 85 85
Puelwood
- fixed grate 50 50 50
See notes for Table Al .7.
Table AL9. Polish Particulates Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source A B C
Coal:
-fixed grate 1850 1370 1370
- mechanical grate 800 600 600
-PF - dry bonom 260 130 130
-PF-wetbottom 170 90 90
Lignite:
-PF - dry bottom 195 95 95
-PF -wet bottom 140 70 70
Coke:
- fixed grate 720 235 235
-mechanicalgrate 310 235 235
See notes for Table A1.7.
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Table Al.10. European Community SO2 Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source existing new
> 50 MWth 25%fllreduction until 1993
43%.areduction until 1995
60%dIreduction until 2003
Coal:
100-500 MWth 84D-4xD1
>500 MW,h 140
Fuel Oil:
50-300 MWth S0O
300-500 MWth 1080-6.5xg/
>500 MWth 120
Natural Gas:
>50 MWth 11
il/compared to 1980
W/x=35 for each 100 MWth of thermal capacity; e.g., if the thermal capacity
is 100 MWth, the corresponding standard is 840-4*35 - 700 g/GJ
L/as above but for each 100 MWth x=30; for 100 MWth unit the standard is
1080-6.5*30 = 885 g/GJ
Table A1.11. European Community NOx Standards
(gIGJ fuel input)
Source existing new
> 50 MWth 20%Wreduction until 1993
36%B/reduction until 1995
Coal:
>50 MWth 228k/
Fuel Oil:
>50 MWth 135
Natural Gas:
> 50 MW,h 109
a/compared to 1980
blfor solid fuels wiLh less than 10% volatile compounds the value is 455 gIGJ
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Table A1.12. European Community Particulates Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source
50 -500 MWt, 35
> 500 MWth 18
Table A1.13. Gerrnan S02 Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source
Coal
ersting plants (tll 1993) 875
1 -o00 MWth, new 700
100-300 MW.h, new 700 and 60% removal
>300,, MWt, new 140 and 85% removal
1-300 MWth, FBC 140 or 75% removal
Fuel Oil:
1- 5 MWh light fuel oil only
5-100 MW,h 510
100-300 MWth 510 and 60% removal
>300 MWth 120 and 85% removal
Gas:
Natural gas 11
Coking &- Refinery gas 31
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Table A1.14. German NOx Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source new existing
Coal
1- 2MWtl,FBC/ 175 175
20- 50 MWh, FBC 105 105
1- 50 MWjh 175
50-300 MWth 140
>300 MWth 70
PP - dry bottomGb/ 228
PF - wet bottom 455
Olher Solids:
grate firing 350
Fuel Oil:
1- 50 MWa, (fight oil) 75
1- 50 MWth (incl.primary
measures) 135
50-300 MWth 90 210
>Z00 MWb 45 210
Natural Gas:
< S0 MWh 62
5O-300MWt 62 155
>300 MWtb 31 155
IFBC - fluidized bed combustion
b/PF -- pulverized fuel
Table AL1S German Particulates Standards
(g/GJ fuel input)
Source new existing
< 5 MWth 53 53
5- 50 MWth 18
> 50 MWth 18 44
lpgite:
> 50 MWIh 18 28
Fuel Oil:
> 5 MWth 1S IS
Natural Gas:
<100 MWtb 2 2
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Table A2.1. Energy Demand and Energy Intensities for the BASE Scenario
Parameter 1988 1990 1995 2000 2010
Gross National Product 100 88 93 117 172
(1988=100)
Final energy demand (PJ)9 3582 2729 3165 3352 3873
Fuel shares (%):
- Solid fuels 37.8 26.7 30.1 27.4 20.0
- Liquid fuels 14.3 16.1 14.9 15.6 19.2
- Gas 13.6 15.9 15.7 16.2 18.2
- Electricity 10.7 13.0 12.1 13-5 15.8
- Heatbi 23.6 28.3 27.2 27.3 26.8
Primar energy demand (PJ) 5387 4223 4829 5071 5848
Fuel shares (%):
- Hard coal 65.9 61.1 61.3 58.4 55.1
- Lignite 11.0 13.4 12.0 10.1 8.7
- Natural gas 7.5 8.9 9.4 11.2 12.9
- Oil 13.7 15.3 15.1 17.3 18.8
- Other 1.9 1.4 2.2 3.0 4.5
Gross Electricity consumption 146 133 149 173 230
CrWh)
Energy intensity of GNP 100 89 96 81 63
1j988= 100) I
Electricity intensity of GNP 100 102 108 100 92
(1988=100) I . _I _
-4Non-energy use of liquid fuels not included
WI1ncludes district hear and steam and hot water geneiated in industrial boilers.
Table A2.2. Changes in Sectoral Energy IntensitiesW/ for the BASE Scenario
(1988 = 100)
Sector 1988 1990 1995 2000 2010
Industryb/ 100 109 108 96 79
Construction 100 79 70 61 50
Agriculture 100 75 94 87 84
Transport 100 87 88 78 61
Other sectors 100 95 83 69 52
Residential 100 70 98 100 107
A/For residential sector, per capita consumption. For other sectors, consumption per unit of
value added, at constant prices
btExcluding energy industries
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Table A2.3. Emissions of Atmospheric Pollutants by Sectors, BASE Case
(thousand tonnes except as noted)
Pollutant/source 1988 1990 2000 2010
Energy conversion 2848 2287 2528 2967
- PPP and CHPi1 2019 1584 1981 2471
- Industrial boilers 670 572 414 385
- Other 159 131 133 111
Final users 979 545 664 608
- Industry 174 133 123 129
- Transport 101 80 104 144
- ResidenfiaVCommercial 704 332 437 335
Total 3827 2832 3192 3575
NO, _
Energy conversion 627 579 596 630
- PPP and CHPA/ 421 386 457 498
- Indusmal boilers 150 131 105 100
- Other 56 62 34 32
Final users 736 608 583 691
- Industry 258 125 134 133
- Transport 520 453 405 515
- ResidencaV/Commercial 57 30 44 43
Total 1363 1187 1179 1321
PM . ,_ _
Energy conversion 1353 1013 991 834
- PPP and CHPa/ 780 574 742 652
- Indusbial boilers 504 369 203 161
- Other 69 70 46 21
Final users 792 455 472 377
- Industry 347 230 196 171
-Transport 37 30 4 4
- Residential/Commercial 408 195 272 202
Total 2145 1468 1463 1211
CO2 (million tonnes) 454 364 432 490
A/PPP -- public power plants; CHP - combined heat and power plants
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Table A2A. Comparison of Scenario Results - Alternative Levels of Controls
BASE CAC
_____________ ____________ 1988 1990 2000 2010 2000 2010
Primnary eneroy demand (PJ) _ - - ___
- Hard coal11l 3549 2594 2966 3223 2834 3095
- Lignite 592 567 511 511 510 513
- Natural gas 406 374 568 755 635 814
-Oil 743 643 876 1100 865 1091
- Nuclear 
- Other 97 44 150 259 155 265
Total 5387 4223 5071 5848 4999 5778
Gross electricity _ _ _
consumption (TWh) 146 133 173 230 172 229
Table A2.4., continued
FRRED EEC GER
2000 2010 2000 2010 20001 2010
Primary enery demand (PJ)
- Hard coaibl 2769 2910 2809 3100 2860 3071
- Lignite 504 440 512 510 513 454
- Natural gas 659 847 632 810 642 820
- Oil 870 1113 865 1094 870 1105
- Nuclear - 144 - - - 82
- Other 155 264 154 267 155 264
Total 4957 5718 4972 5781 5040 5810
Gross electricity
consumption (TWh) _ 170 226 172 230 177 231
B/non-energy use not included
llcoke exports are included in hard coal balance
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Table A2.5. Emissions of PoHlutants - Alternative Levels of Controls
(thousand tonnes except as noted)
BASE CAC
Polutant/source 1988 19902 2000 2010 2000 2010
SO?
- new PPpp/ - - 206 677 30 99
- existing PPP 2019 1584 1448 1329 1043 882
- new CHP DI - - 112 310 11 32
- existing CHP - - 215 155 222 155
- industrial boilers 670 572 414 385 349 286
- other energyconversion 159 131 133 III 116 98
- fmal users 979 545 664 608 546 465
Total 3827 2832 3192 3575 2317 2017
NO, I
- new PPP - - 42 132 40 130
- existing PPP 421 386 308 234 193 151
-new CHP- - 22 64 18 61
-existing CHP- - 84 62 51 37
-industrial boilers 150 131 105 100 62 67
- other energy conversion 56 62 34 38 31 32
-fumin users 736 608 583 691 516 428
Total 1363 1187 1178 1321 911 906
- new PPP - - 7 48 3 36
-existing PPP 780 574 498 410 101 103
new CHP - - 2 6 1 5
-existing CHP - - 235 188 26 18
indusal boilers 504 369 203 161 100 85
- other energy conversion 69 70 46 21 49 29
-fnal users 792 455 472 377 440 353
Total 2145 1468 1463 1211 720 629
C29 (million tonnes) 454 364 432 490 423 482
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Table A2.5., continued
FRRED EEC GER
PolUutant/source 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
-new PPP 133 332 24 95 21 41
-existing PPP 1001 698 973 530 149 110
-new CHP 85 170 15 45 8 33
-existing CHP 152 83 190 148 41 31
-induslnal boilers 301 197 403 386 273 262
-other energy conversion 100 72 133 109 155 224
- fial users 546 465 546 465 546 465
Total 2318 2017 2284 1778 1193 1166
CO9 (million tonnes) 417 461 421 482 427 474
A/PPP -- public power plant
b/CHP -- combined heat and power plant
VIData on PPP for 1988 and 1990 include CHP Plants
Table A2.6. Comparison of Scenario Results - Instruments for Large Stationary Sources
CAC ETAX1 S02TR
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Primary energy demand (PJ) ___ ______
- Hard coal 2834 3095 2798 3071 28!6 3018
- Lignite 510 513 513 513 513 513
-Natural gas 635 814 642 779 642 812
-Oil 865 1091 832 1102 850 1113
- Nuclear
- Other 155 265 155 264 155 264
Total 4999 5778 4940 5729 4976 5720
Gross electricity
consumption (rWh) 172 229 170 227 170 226
See notes to Table A2.4
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Table A2.7. Emissions of Pollutants - Instruments for Large Stationary Sources
(thousand ton nes except as noted)
C_A_C ETAXI S02TR
Pollutant/source 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
SO-, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |. 
- new ppp 30 99 118 420 112 387
-existing PPP 1043 882 937 386 885 405
-new ClHP I1 32 77 199 64 186
-existing CIHP 222 155 180 119 194 134
- industrial boilers 349 286 361 332 389 328
- oier energy conversion 116 98 94 110 128 112
- final users 546 465 546 465 546 465
Total 2317 2017 2313 2031 2318 2017
NO,, _ _
-new PPP 40 130 37 123 34 121
-existing PPP 193 151 187 146 191 147
-new CUDP 18 61 22 64 22 64
-existing CHP 51 37 49 36 49 36
- industrial boilers 62 67 68 70 65 69
- other energy conversion 31 32 30 37 27 32
-final users 516 428 516 428 516 428
ToLal 911 906 909 904 904 897
PM_
new ppp 3 36 3 26 2 27
-existing PPP 101 103 84 77 81 78
-new CHP 1 5 2 6 2 6
-existing CHIP 26 18 15 11 18 13
-industrial boilers 100 85 196 143 97 69
- other energy conversion 49 29 26 22 54 55
- final users 440 353 440 353 440 353
Total 720 629 766 638 694 601
1 C02(mlliontomes 423 482 418 478 420 476
See notes to Table A2.5
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Table A2.. Comparison of Scenario Results - Tax on All Fuel Users
CAC ETAX2
2000 2010 2000 2010
Primary energy demand (PJ)
- Hard coal 2834 3095 2625 2769
- Lignite 510 513 513 513
- Natural gas 635 814 642 768
- Oil 865 1091 894 1116
- Nuclear - - - 152
- Other 155 265 155 264
Total 4999 5778 4829 5582
Gross electricity
consumption (TWh) 172 229 167 225
See notes to Table A2A
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Table A2.9. Emission of Pollutants - Tax on All Fuel Users
(thousakid tonnes except as noted)
CAC ETAX2
Pollutant/source 2000 2010 2000 2010
so')__
- new PPP 30 99 122 321
- existing PPP 1043 882 873 406
- new CHP 1 1 32 118 173
- existing CHP 222 155 165 106
- industrial boilers 349 286 347 335
- other energy conversion 116 98 79 111
- final users 546 465 609 543
Total 2317 2017 2313 1995
NO, _
-new PPP 40 130 28 17
- existing PPP 193 151 188 146
-new CHP 18 61 16 16
-existing CHP 51 37 49 36
- industrial boilers 62 67 64 64
- other energy conversion 31 32 28 31
-final usel s 516 428 544 08
Total 911 906 917 918
PMl
- new ppp | 3 36 3 23
- existing PPP 101 103 80 76
- new CHP 1 5 2 5
- existing CHP 26 18 16 11
- industrial boilers 100 85 191 156
- other energy conversion 49 29 18 21
- final users 440 353 434 342
Total 720 629 744 634
CO (million tomes) 423 482 405 449
See notes to Table A2.5
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Table A2.10. Comparison of Scenario Results - Coal Tax
BASE CAC COALTX
_ 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Finat energy demand (P1) _
- Solid fuels 920 773 856 727 654 572
-Liquid fuels 524 744 517 723 524 743
- Gas 543 703 572 724 543 703
- Electricity 450 613 441 597 433 590
- Heat 915 1041 905 1026 874 1005
Total 3352 3874 3291 3797 3029 3613
Primary energy denand (PJ) _ __ .
- Hard coal 2966 3223 2834 3095 2359 2442
- Lignite 511 511 510 513 519 522
- Natural gas 568 755 635 814 642 838
- Oil 876 1100 865 1091 1043 1193
- Nuclear - - - - - 294
- Other 150 259 155 265 156 261
Total 5071 5848 4999 5778 4717 5549
Gross electricity
consumption (TWh) 173 230 172 229 166 222
See notes to Table A2.4
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Table A2.11. Emission of Pollutants - Coal Tax
(thousand tonnes except as noted)
BASE CAC COALTX
Pollutant/source 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010o_SO_ _
-new PPP 206 677 30 99 115 281
-existing PPP 1448 1329 1043 882 1444 1338
-newCHP 112 310 11 32 115 317
-existing CHP 215 155 222 155 231 176
- industrial boilers 414 385 349 286 531 452
-other energy conversion 133 lit 116 98 105 113
- final users 664 608 546 465 487 477
Total 3192 3575 2317 2017 3028 3154
NO, __I
- new PPP 42 132 40 130 23 54
- existing PPP 308 234 193 151 308 235
-new CHP 22 64 18 61 18 61
-existing CH? 84 62 5 1 37 84 63
-industrial boilers 105 100 62 67 89 91
-other energy conversion 34 38 31 32 39 46
- final users 583 691 516 428 556 669
Total 1178 1321 911 906 1175 1288
PM 
-new Ppp 7 48 3 36 3 22
-existing PPP 498 410 101 103 498 410
-new CBP 2 6 1 S 2 6
- existing CUP 235 188 26 18 270 255
-industrial boilers 203 161 100 85 151 156
-other energy conversion 46 21 49 29 40 55
-final users 472 377 440 353 336 276
Total 1463 1211 720 629 1300 1180
CO (million tonnes) 432 490 423 482 386 427
See notes to Table A2.5
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Table A2.12. Costs of Emission Control Measures ror Large
Stationary and Transport Sources
Measure | Pollutant Unit cost,
_ reduced [US$/tonne
Car catalytic converters NOX 9700
Low emission NOx 810
diesel engines
Diesel oil SO2 4000
desulphurization
Selective catalytic NOx 1800-2000
reduction, new power
plantat
Desulphurization, new S0 2 510
hard coal power
.planti5/ _I 
flRoughly 35 percent more for combined heat and power plant.
b/Assumes 23 GJlt calorific value and 1% sulphur content.
Table A2.13. Total Undiscounted Energy Supply and
Conversion Investments
Period
Scenario 199!-2000 1991-2010
BASE 27.1 65.7
CAC 29.2 70.2
GER 38.1 U2.8
ETAX2 27.6 71.8
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Table A2.14. Production of Hard Coal and Lignite
(million tce)
._________ 1988 1990 1995 2000 2010
BASE 141.2W 135.2W/ 133.3 132.9 136.4
CAC 132.7 132.9 136.4
FRRED 128.1 132.7 134.0
EEC 132.7 132.9 136.4
CER 129.9 132.9 134.5
IETAX1 129.3 132.9 136.4
SO2TR 131.6 132.9 136.4
ETAX2 130.9 132.9 134.9
COALTX 133.2 129.8 133.8
3/Actuals
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